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linear maximum likelihood (PROBIT) techniques are used to estimate the selection, 
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One of the objectives of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has always been to 
train and retain quality personnel, both officer and enlisted, to achieve a more effective 
fighting force. Currently the Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) portion of the fiscal 
year 1996 USMC budget, the part which supports the pay, ·allowances, and all other 
manpower-related programs for all USMC personnel, is 75.2 percent of9.5 billion dollars 
(Justice, 1995). With such a large portion of the budget consumed by manpower, the Marine 
Corps has increased scrutiny of existing programs and policies in an attempt to reallocate 
funds for operational requirements. Recent force structure reductions are a clear example of 
this trend, and it is likely that future reductions will be taken out of the manpower force, 
either by terminating programs, changing costly policies, or cutting additional structure. 
Thus, any research devoted to identify individual independent factors which contribute to 
better performance, better retention, and higher probabilities of promotion, while at the same 
time maintain or increase operational effectiveness could greatly assist in increasing the 
quality of the force. Ideally, these same factors will also achieve cost savings and maximize 
military effectiveness. 
One such independent factor is education. General Krulak, the 31st Commandant of 
the Marine Corps, stated in his planning guidance that 
... education is the foundation for a Marine Corps that can anticipate and adapt 
to the changing world that we are entering. Training and education must lead 
to better, more effective, more adaptable Marines. (Krulak, 1995) 
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The question remains, however, as to whether or not current educational programs and 
policies are leading to better, more effective Marines -- or whether better Marines are simply 
taking advantage of education programs offered to them. Additionally, there is a question 
of whether these Marines are exiting the Marine Corps for better jobs in the civilian sector 
once they take advantage of those educational programs. This thesis will examine one piece 
of this larger issue -- graduate education for Marine Corps officers. For the purposes of this 
thesis, a 'better, more effective' Marine Corps officer is defined as an officer who is more 
likely to be promoted (as per promotion board results), one who is more likely to remain on 
active duty, and one who is a better performer (as per fitness report documentation). 
B. BACKGROUND 
Many studies have been conducted which examined individual characteristics, 
including graduate education, affecting promotion, retention, and performance. Most of these 
studies were performed independently, were focused on a specific policy or issue, and were 
limited by availability of data for analysis. Each study attempted to create statistical models 
useful in predicting either promotion or retention behavior and to improve the overall 
manpower process. This research combines the elements of those studies, focuses on the 
policy of providing graduate education to Marine Corps officers, and uses longitudinal data 
to allow for examination of possible trends over time. 
Several important points must be addressed regarding Marine Corps officers and their 
career paths. All candidates for commission, regardless of their source, must first attend 
Officer Candidate School (OCS). OCS is the first experience an individual has with life as 
a Marine Corps officer, and the training program is ultimately designed as a selection 
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instrument to test an individual's desire. Those who complete OCS are then eligible for 
commissioning once they complete their undergraduate degree, if not completed already. The 
next step, once commissioned, is the Basic School (TBS). TBS is a six month training 
program which all Marine Corps officers must attend. The training is designed to ensure that 
all Marine Corps officers have the basic skills to perform adequately as infantry platoon 
leaders. Officers are tested on their military, academic, and leadership skills, and these scores 
are combined into a single score, then officers are ranked from best to worst. The officers 
are then categorized into three groups based upon their ranking, and military occupational 
skills (MOS's) are then distributed equally among each third to ensure a 'quality spread' of 
officers across occupations. Upon graduation, the officers then attend their MOS school and 
are sent to their first assignments in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). 
After the initial assignment, an officer's career can take many different directions, but 
there are linking factors which may contribute to success. Generally, the second assignment 
is in a non FMF billet such as recruiting duty, independent duty, or duty with a Marine Corps 
Base activity. By the third assignment, the officer has normally achieved the rank of captain 
(0-3) and usually returns to an operational command in the FMF within his or her 
occupational specialty. Then, once an officer becomes eligible for promotion to major (0-4), 
some sort of headquarters staff assignment is most likely. By the time an officer reaches the 
major (0-4) promotion point, at least four different assignments have been completed. The 
linking factors in officer assignment patterns are the amount of time an officer has served in 
positions requiring their MOS, considered MOS time, and the amount oftime an officer has 
served in operational units, considered FMF time. Conceptually, more time spent in one's 
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MOS and in the FMF ensures that an individual officer is fully trained and qualified to perform 
successfully in an operational environment, which is arguably the Marine Corps' primary 
purpose. 
During any assignment phase, an officer can potentially achieve a graduate education. 
There are several possible ways to obtain a graduate education while on active duty in the 
Marine Corps. An officer can apply for the Special Education Program (SEP) or the 
Advanced Degree Program (ADP) and receive a fully funded graduate education at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), the Armed Forces Institute of Technology (AFIT), or a civilian 
university. These officers incur an additional four years of service commitment to repay the 
cost of the fully funded education, and these officers generally serve in specialized billets 
designated for their graduate degree. A second option is for an officer to pursue a graduate 
degree on his or her off-duty time while stationed near a postgraduate facility, generally a 
civilian university. These officers can receive tuition assistance which covers up to 75 percent 
of the cost for each class. The officer then incurs an additional obligated service of two years 
from the date of completion of the course of instruction for which monetary benefits were 
received. These officers generally are not assigned to specialized billets after receiving their 
degree. 
Since the graduate education choice is possible at any point in an officer's career, it 
is essential to include those variables that effect an officer's career in any analysis of the effects 
of graduate education on performance. Either of the two possible means of obtaining a 
graduate education definitively impact an officer's retention behavior. Those officers who 
choose graduate education may be more likely to separate, but end up remaining on active 
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duty for the perceived added value of a graduate education. Potentially, retention and 
graduate education interact with each other such that on-the-job performance measures 
appear to be positive while in essence they have a negative impact on performance. 
C. PURPOSE AND INTENT 
The principal purpose of this thesis is to assess whether or not Marine Corps officers 
who have obtained a postgraduate degree since their initial commission have a higher 
performance level than their peers. This question will be analyzed through the use of 
multivariate models using the performance measures of retention and promotion to the grade 
of major, usually reached between the tenth and twelfth year of service (DOPMA, 1980). An 
actual on-the-job performance measure of fitness report markings will be used as an 
independent variable, since promotion and retention are outcomes of actual performance and 
not pure measures of performance. Promotion, retention, and performance, as well as 
graduate education, quite possibly interact with each other; not modeling selectivity or 
possible effects of omitted variables could produce significant biases in the estimated effects 
of variables in the theoretical models formulated, making them invalid for use in predicting 
the future or in accurately conducting a cost benefit analysis. If, for example, a large 
percentage of officers with graduate degrees separate before ever being eligible for promotion 
to major, and these officers had a significantly higher level of performance and a higher 
predicted probability for promotion than their peers, then there is a clear indication that more 
qualified officers are separating. If this retention behavior and its effect on sample truncation 
is modeled, more accurate estimates of the independent effect of graduate education can be 
obtained. 
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D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Hopefully to this point the reader has been informed as to why manpower and 
personnel programs are under scrutiny and the necessity, within the manpower arena, to 
conduct analyses to improve the quality of the force. Chapter II presents a review of the 
relevant literature on performance measurement and how graduate education has been used 
as a measure of performance. Furthermore, a discussion of how bias could be introduced into 
a study and its possible impact on the estimated effects of graduate education is provided. 
Chapter III describes the data used in this study and the samples created for statistical 
examination. Additionally, the theoretical basis for the variables included in the statistical 
models will be discussed. Chapter IV presents the non-parametric results of the data analysis. 
Cross-tabulations and statistical tests are provided to inform the reader as to the general 
characteristics of the data and the simple nature of the relationship between the variables 
analyzed. Chapter V presents the method of statistical analysis used for the multivariate 
models, provides the results of those models, and discusses the independent effects of certain 
personal and professional characteristics, especially graduate education, on the dependent 
measures of performance. And finally, Chapter VI summarizes the findings of this study, 
whether or not graduate education increases performance, and provides recommendations for 
future research efforts. 
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IT. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. MEASURES OF ON-THE-JOB PERFORMANCE 
Interest in identifying any individual characteristics which mcrease on-the-job 
performance or 'quality of the work force' is not new or unique. Wise (1975) first analyzed 
the effect of ability and college background on salary growth and promotion probability in the 
civilian sector. In doing so, he formulated a theoretical on-the-job performance model which 
is the basis for this research. His model states that performance measures are a function of 
cognitive skills, affective traits, and demographic characteristics. He found that personnel in 
professional-managerial positions with masters of arts degrees had a higher annual salary 
growth rate and a higher promotion probability than their peers without graduate education. 
Further civilian studies conducted by Medoff and Abraham (1980; 1981) and Woo 
(1986) also analyzed the effects of graduate education. They, too, found that graduate 
education had a positive effect on salary levels. They did not, however, come to the same 
conclusions as Wise. Medoff and Abraham concluded that earnings were higher for master's 
degree holders due to their initial entry into the labor market at a higher wage rate. Woo 
concluded that since graduate education did not increase job evaluation levels or probability 
of promotion, graduate education may not improve on-the-job performance. Neither of these 
two studies addressed the potential self-selection bias imposed by the fact that promotion is 
dependent on the individual's retention decision. Clearly, an individual that chooses to leave 
the firm prior to a given promotion point is no longer observed, although past performance 
may predict that the individual would be promoted. Graduate education could be an 
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important factor in both the retention decision and the promotion outcome or the salary 
growth rate. 
On-the-job performance measures used in these civilian studies are comparable to 
those available in the military. Since the theoretical model developed by Wise is broad 
enough to be applied to the military, the remainder of this section will review pertinent 
literature as it pertains to the military on the three dependent measures of performance which 
are the foundation of this study: Promotion, retention, and actual performance ratings as 
measured by the USMC fitness report. 
1. Promotion 
Prom-otion to the next higher grade has often been used as a proxy for indicating a 
military o:fficer1S performance. Cymrot (1986) was the first researcher to focus on the effects 
of fully funded graduate education on promotion in the military. Using a cross-section of all 
Navy officers on active duty in 1985, he found that graduate education significantly increased 
the probability of promotion to lieutenant commander by 26 percent. In his statistical model, 
he attempted to control for the self-selection bias of a more motivated or intelligent 
individual possibly choosing oneself for graduate education by including a control variable 
for those officers who were promoted earlier than their peers. He concluded that 
improved promotion rates, however, are only one component of the marginal 
benefit [of graduate education]; the other components are increased 
productivity within rank and increased retention. Before assessing the overall 
efficiency of graduate education in the Navy, it is necessary to estimate the 
magnitudes ofthese effects. (Cymrot, 1986) 
Talaga (I 994) also analyzed the relationship of fully funded graduate education on the 
probability of promotion to Lieutenant Commander in the Navy. Rather than controlling for 
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selection bias using early promotion as an indicator, Talaga obtained actual fitness report data 
and merged it with the Navy Officer Master File. He then used the recommendation for 
accelerated promotion (RAP) as a performance measure and included RAP in his probit 
selection model to estimate the impact of performance on the likelihood of being selected for 
fully-funded graduate education. He then included the graduate education variable in the 
second stage of his promotion model to control for selection bias. By controlling for selection 
bias, he found that the likelihood of promotion only increased by 13.6 percent, as compared 
to the 26 percent reported by Cymrot. 
In an attempt to clarify the extent graduate education enhances on-the-job 
performance- for USN officers, Mehay and Bowman (1995) conducted a bivariate probit 
analysis using the on-the-job performance theoretical model developed by Wise. As 
independent variables, they constructed a performance measure comprised of the percentage 
offitness reports in pay grade 0-3 containing a RAP. As cognitive skills, they used college 
Grade Point Average (GPA), type of major, and whether or not a Master's Degree had been 
obtained. They used source of commission as their only affective trait and included race, sex, 
age, and marital status as their demographic characteristics. Their bivariate probit 
specification modeled the decision ofNavy unrestricted line officers on active duty from 1980 
to 1994 whether to participate in graduate education or not and that decision's effect on 
promotion outcome. By using bivariate probit, they were able to control for the selection bias 
of the choice to attend graduate education. They, like Talaga, found that graduate education 
has a positive effect on the promotion outcome, but when controlling for selection bias, the 
estimated coefficient of the graduate education variable is significantly reduced. They 
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concluded that 
graduate education has direct effects on measures of job performance, those 
effects are independent of ability and prior performance, and additional human 
capital (both specific and general) does enhance productivity. (Mehay and 
Bowman, 1995) 
Since their data was a pooled cross-section, they recommended that future research be 
conducted to include examination of the selectivity bias introduced by the separation decision 
and to examine cohort data which would allow for analysis of possible career pattern effects 
on graduate education. 
Similar studies have analyzed the effect of graduate education on officer promotions 
in the USMC. Long (1992) examined all officers in the primary promotion zones to the 
grades of 0-4, 0-5, and 0-6 for fiscal years 1986 through 1992. While not focusing his 
research specifically on the impact of graduate education, he did include an independent 
variable for an advanced degree holder. For promotion to 0-4 and 0-5, having an advanced 
degree significantly increased the probability of promotion. Unfortunately, the data used did 
not include a performance measure, and Long did not control for selection bias based on the 
graduate education selection decision. 
One study of USMC officers which did focus on the effect of graduate education on 
promotion was conducted as a Master's thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) by 
Major David Estridge (1995). Rather than focusing on the effect of all types of graduate 
education, he examined the effect of a degree obtained at NPS. He obtained fitness report 
data on those officers in the promotion zone to the grades of major and lieutenant colonel 
for fiscal years 1993 and 1994. By using a constructed performance index as an explanatory 
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variable, he was able to control for the self-selection bias based on choosing graduate 
education, and he, too, found that officers with an NPS postgraduate degree are more likely 
to be promoted to major or lieutenant colonel than officers who are non-NPS graduates. A 
unique finding in his study was that the difference in promotion rates was even more distinct 
if the subject matter studied matched with an officer's occupational specialty, suggesting that 
specific graduate education has a greater effect on performance than general education. 
Unfortunately, since his data was a cross-section of only active duty officers in zone for 
promotion, he was unable to determine what effect, if any, graduate education had on 
retention. 
2. Retention 
Since the focus in the military today is to increase the quality of the force while 
reducing manpower costs, retaining the most qualified officers is paramount. The decision 
to stay or leave is primarily an individual decision, not an organizational one, so it is important 
to take into account the individual characteristics which lead to higher predicted retention. 
Then, it is necessary to examine those same characteristics using other performance measures 
to analyze retention policies as they could effect the ultimate effectiveness of the force. 
Schmidt (1982) analyzed the career orientation of junior USN officers using data from a 1978 
Rand Corporation survey. He concentrated on officers with more than two but less than 10 
years of service. He found that the most important factor in an individual's decision to stay 
in the military was the individual's overall satisfaction with Navy life. The individual's general 
feelings towards his job and organization were next in importance. These general sentiments 
also apply to USMC officer retention decisions. Marine Corps officers interviewed as part 
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of another study, 
... felt that promotion potential was a major factor when determining whether 
to remain on active duty or leave the service. Further, they felt that a high 
promotion potential would indicate satisfaction with the service while a low 
promotion potential would cause an officer to resign his commission. 
(Esmann, 1984) 
Theilmann (1990) analyzed Marine Corps officer separation behavior for officers in 
their initial period of obligated service using information contained in the 1985 DOD Survey 
of Officer and Enlisted Personnel matched with data obtained from the Defense Manpower 
Data Center. He analyzed the effect of intrinsic and extrinsic job satisfaction factors, 
satisfaction with benefits, current location, and community attitudes on the stay or leave 
decision. He concluded that 
the factors which most strongly influence male junior officers to remain on 
active duty beyond their initial service obligation are their commissioning 
source, marital/dependent status, military occupational specialty, and intrinsic 
and extrinsic job satisfaction factors. (Theilmann, 1990) 
While his model was statistically significant, he was not able to make any conclusions about 
retention decisions as they occur over time, since his data was cross-sectional. 
Steele (1987) also examined retention using data obtained from the 1985 DOD Survey 
of Officer and Enlisted Personnel, but he expanded his retention question to include Marine 
Corps officers with four fo twelve ·years of service. Using a question from the survey which 
provided an officer's intended length of service, he categorized individuals as careerists (those 
who indicated they would serve more than 20 years in the military) and noncareerists (those 
who indicated they would separate prior to reaching 20 years of service). Trying to 
accurately predict an individual officer's retention decision, he concluded that 
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potential non-careerists are more accurately identified by using the mean value 
of the predicted probability of being a careerist as the cutoff point. Otherwise, 
it would be easier to just assume that everyone is a potential careerist. 
(Steele, 1987) 
He did include education as an independent variable in the retention model, but found that 
education was not statistically significant for either careerists or non-careerists. These 
findings are important for two reasons in this research. First, those factors necessary to 
predict whether an individual officer is a careerist are critical to specifying a model for non-
careerists. Second, the contradictory results of the value of education raise doubts as to the 
validity of self-reported cross-sectional data for determining separation behavior of an 
individual at ~ future point in time. 
Further research which validates the need for longitudinal rather than cross-sectional 
data in retention studies was conducted by Hamm III (1994). Using a completely non-
parametric approach, he examined differences in success or failure at three successive career 
steps for Marine Corps officers: The Basic School (TBS), selection to captain, and selection 
to major. While his focus was on differences in success and failure rates between racial/ethnic 
groups, his analysis included evaluation of the effects of marital status, commissioning source, 
and occupational field, and he was able to examine differences over time since his data was 
longitudinal and included- all officers who entered the Marine Corps from 1980 to 1991. He 
found significant differences between cohorts in all variables. "The implication is that 'when' 
an officer enters the Marine Corps has a significant impact on success [or failure]." (Hamm 
III, 1994) Thus, retention studies must involve data which allows for examination of 
individual characteristics at various points in time, rather than at only one moment. 
13 
Unfortunately, Hamm III did not examine graduate education, but his work resulted 
in a subsequent Master's thesis at the NPS prepared by Lieutenant Brian Miller (1995) on the 
estimated effects on minority officer retention behavior based on the recent drawdown in 
manning levels. He theorized that officers in the Marine Corps reach three key decision 
points in their careers, between entry and the fourth year which coincides with the end of the 
initial obligated service and includes early attrition, between the fourth and twelfth year which 
coincides with the promotion point to 0-4 (truly the career decision point) and includes early 
separations in the period, and between the twelfth and nineteenth years which coincides with 
the late leave decision and early retirement window. He first used a log-linear survival model 
to examine th.e average months in service of officers with different personal characteristics, 
then used a non-linear logistic regression equation to predict the probability of separation. 
While his primary focus was on minority officers, his models did include a postgraduate 
degree variable which significantly increased the probability of staying for all three phases. 
Marine Corps officers with postgraduate education were more likely to survive to each 
decision point and were less likely to separate during any of the three phases. He was not, 
however, able to obtain performance data for his study which should be an important factor 
in an individual's retention decision as determined by Schmidt and Esmann earlier in this 
section. Those individual's with a lower average performance could potentially forecast that 
their opportunity to be promoted is lower, be less satisfied with military life, and choose to 
leave the service. 
North and Smith (1993) also did not evaluate a performance indicator in their study, 
but they were able to control for selection bias caused by the retention decision. In their 
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analysis of promotions to captain and major in the USMC, they used a longitudinal file of all 
Marine Corps officer accessions from fiscal years 1980 through 1991. They were able to 
conclude that different accession characteristics were important in predicting promotion to 
captain as compared to promotion to major. Additionally, they were able to show that by 
controlling for the retention decision, differences between promotion rates between 
population subgroups were significantly reduced, validating the technique used. 
Unfortunately, their analysis only pertained to accession characteristics which did not include 
education level. 
3. Performance Information 
Promotion and retention are simply observed outcomes of an individual's performance 
and may not be as useful in predicting the true effects of graduate education on on-the-job 
performance. Thus, a more precise indicator of performance which should be an independent 
variable in a promotion or retention model is necessary. One such indicator is the Marine 
Corps performance appraisal system which includes a requirement for an individual's 
immediate supervisor to quantitatively, although subjectively, assess the Marine's actual on-
the-job performance on a recurring basis. When fitness report data first became available, 
most research was conducted on retention behavior, principally due to the theoretical belief 
that one's perception of promotion potential is linked to intrinsic job satisfaction and a key 
element in the retention decision. A rudimentary performance index was created in 1984 as 
an attempt to capture actual on-the-job performance for use as an independent variable in 
manpower models to explain Marine Corps officer attrition (Esmann, 1984). Using logistic 
regression with the stay or leave decision as the dependent variable and the performance index 
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as an independent variable, he found that the performance index could not reliably predict an 
officer's likelihood of attrition. Based on the results, the author concluded that it was 
necessary to add a job assignment variable as well as an occupational specialty variable. The 
author hypothesized that the performance index may be higher for people in non competitive 
military occupational specialties (I\10S's), and may be lower for people in better jobs. He did 
not include education as a variable in his model specification. 
In a follow on study conducted by Stephen Hurst and Thomas Manion (1985), 
additional factors determining the stay or leave choice were modeled. They included the 
military-civilian pay ratio, the unemployment rate, and a performance index as variables in the 
model. They examined data on every Marine Officer on active duty from 1977 to 1984, 
created a performance index score by summing individual fitness report markings and dividing 
by the individual's total number of reports. They used logistic regression analysis to 
determine the predictability of attrition. While they were able to predict within 90 percent 
accuracy the following year's actual attrition, they were not able to accurately predict any 
subsequent years with accuracy. Education was also not included as a variable in their model 
specification. 
B. TYPES OF BIAS 
Up to this point the term 'selection bias• has been used frequently in general terms to 
indicate possible shortfalls in the previous studies cited. Before continuing, it is necessary to 
completely define the potential types of bias with respect to obtaining postgraduate education, 
remaining in the Marine Corps, and being promoted as they pertain to this study. 
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Selectivity concerns the presence of some characteristic of the treatment (or 
control) group that is both associated with receipt of the treatment and 
associated with the outcome so as to lead to a false attribution of causality 
regarding treatment and outcomes. So stated, selectivity bias is a version of 
omitted-variable bias, which is commonly analyzed under the rubric of 
specification error in econometric models. (Barnow et al., 1980) 
Other forms of bias include "inclusion of an unnecessary variable, ... adopting the wrong 
functional form, ... [and] errors of measurement." (Gujarati, 1995) Each form of bias 
ultimately results in an upward or downward effect on the coefficient of the variable being 
analyzed. We have seen that controlling for the selection bias involved with graduate 
education significantly reduces the independent effect on the probability of promotion (from 
26 down to 13 percent). This potential selection bias for choosing graduate education will 
be controlled for by introducing a selection equation. Another selection equation will be 
introduced to control for the potential selection bias of choosing to stay or leave the military. 
Obviously, if a high quality performer decides to separate prior to a given promotion point, 
then promotion as an outcome of performance is not accurately reflected unless the retention 
decision is controlled for. 
Three other potential biases, forms of omitted relevant variable bias, will also be 
examined. First, a potential bias from choice of source will be examined by inclusion of 
commissioning source control variables in the multivariate models. Different types of 
individuals apply for and are accepted to different commissioning programs. Hypothetically, 
those individuals who apply for the Naval Academy may be higher quality than those 
individuals who simply attend OCS after graduating from college. Also, a potential bias from, 
occupational assignment will be examined by inclusion of occupational category control 
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variables. Perhaps performance is a function of what value particular occupations have within 
an organization rather than how well an individual performs within his or her occupation. 
Finally, the potential bias for an individual's taste and preference for military life will be 
controlled for by including the ranking at TBS as an independent variable. On average, those 
officers who graduate in the top of their TBS class have a greater taste for life as a Marine 
Corps officer than those who graduate at the bottom. The specific variables used in this 
research and an explanation of the method of analysis employed to account for these biases 




The core of the data used in this study are drawn from the Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC). Further information was drawn from the Marine Corps Automated Fitness 
Report System (AFRS), the Headquarters Master File (HMF) and the Official Military 
Personnel File (OMPF). Marine Corps specific data was obtained from Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps (MA) located in Washington, D.C. All sources were merged into one file for 
analysis. Each unit of observation is an individual officer who accessed into the USMC 
during fiscal year 1980. Each record has an annual update of each variable through fiscal year 
1994 and thus constitutes a cohort file which allows for longitudinal evaluation. A 
comprehensive listing of the dataset variables and their definitions are provided in Appendix 
A for use in any follow-on studies. Specific variable names and their descriptions which are 
of substantive use in this analysis are included in Table I on the following page. Grouping the 
variables by categories as defined by the on-the-job performance model facilitates describing 
the model specification and the choice of the variables for analysis. A high quality officer has 
already been defined as one who chooses to remain in the USMC, one who is promoted, and 
one who has a higher performance average than his or her peers. The construction of the 
STA YPROM and PROMOTE variables is self-explanatory, but the creation of the AVGPI 
variable requires further explanation. 
The construction of a performance index was first outlined by Haffey (1986) and 
validated by Armell III (1988). Armell III studied the relationship between fitness report 
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STAYPROM = 1 if stayed to the 0-4 promotion point; 0 otherwise 
PROMOTE = 1 if promoted to 0-4; 0 otherwise 
AVGPI =the average performance index for an officer's entire career 
Cognitive Skills 
GCT =General Classification Test score taken on entry 
COMPRK = Composite ranking at the Basic School 
OBPGRAD = 1 if obtained a postgraduate degree since entering the Marine Corps 
Affective Traits 
ROTC = 1 ifReserve Officer Training Candidate source; 0 otherwise 
ACADEMY = 1 if Naval Academy source; 0 otherwise 
ocs = 1 if Officer Candidate School source; 0 otherwise 
ENLCOM = 1 if commissioned after serving previously as an enlisted member of 
the Armed Services; 0 otherwise 
II PLC = 1 if Platoon Leaders Class source; 0 otherwise I 
I COMBAT = 1 if in a combat arms related MOS; 0 otherwise I 
I SERVICE = 1 if in a service related MOS; 0 otherwise I 
II SUPPORT = 1 if in a ground support related MOS; 0 otherwise I 
I AIRS UP = 1 if in an aviation related support MOS; 0 otherwise I 
II PILOTS = 1 if either a fixed or rotary wing pilot MOS; 0 otherwise II 
RESERVE = 1 if received a reserve commission on entry; 0 if received a regular 
commission 
Demographic Traits 
AGE = Age at Entry (1980) 
MINORITY = 1 if from minority population group; 0 otherwise 
FEMALE = 1 if female; 0 otherwise 
MARRIED = 1 if ever married through separation or present date; 0 otherwise 
UNEMP =the general civilian unemployment rate for each year 
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scores and selected characteristics ofMarine Corps Officers and found that the performance 
index was statistically significant in identifying individual characteristics which contributed 
to an average higher performance. The performance index is the best available measure of 
on-the-job performance, because in section B of the fitness report, Marines are quantitatively 
marked on a scale (not observed=N, unsatisfactory=O, below average= I, average=3, above 
average=S, excellent=?, and outstanding=9) on twenty two professional and personal 
characteristics. These characteristics are divided into three categories of performance, 
qualities, and overall value to the service. The individual scores are summed, then the total 
sum is divided by the number of observed marks to attain an average for each report. This 
study will compute the performance index slightly differently. Each individual officer receives 
a fitness report on at least an annual basis, so this study sums the average of each report , then 
divides by the total number of reports received by each individual over the course of that 
officer's career. We would expect that average performance would increase over time as the 
level of work experience increases, just as we would expect that the variance in the average 
performance of the sample would decrease as officers with lower performance averages 
separate from the Marine Corps. The focus of this study is to determine whether the average 
performance ofthose with graduate education is significantly higher than of those who have 
not obtained a postgraduate degree. The remainder of the variable groupings and their 




1. Cognitive Skills 
The GCT score ranges from 0 to a maximum of 150 and is very similar to other 
intelligence measures such as the Scholastic Aptitude Test. The minimum score required for 
entry is 120, but waivers are allowed so some values may be lower. We would expect that 
a higher GCT would lead to a higher probability of promotion to 0-4. Similarly, we would 
expect that an officer's COMPRK at the Basic School would directly impact on an officer's 
level of performance over time. This variable should not only measure an officer's level of 
cognitive ability, but also his or her taste and preference for military life. Those who show 
signs of disinterest while at TBS generally tend to be ranked lower than their more interested 
peers who are ranked higher. 
Level of education (OBPGRAD) is the focus of this research and to this point, the 
literature indicates that graduate education increases an officer's probability of promotion and 
probability of staying on active duty. Labor economic theory on education, as it applies to 
the overall labor market, states that: 
1. Average earnings of :full-time workers rise with the level of education; 
2. The most rapid increase in earnings occurs early in one's working life, thus 
giving a convex shape to the age/earnings profiles ofboth men and women; 
3. Age/earnings profiles tend to fan out, so that education-related earnings 
differences later in workers' lives are greater than those early on. (Ehrenberg 
and Smith, 1994) 
In the military, however, it does not make sense to compare earnings differences by 
education. It is an internal labor market, i.e., all officers enter the Marine Corps as second 
lieutenants and progress through the system at the same pace. Rarely, if ever, are there 
accelerated promotions in the USMC, and the military's 'up or out' philosophy is designed to 
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ensure that lower performers must separate. The question remains, though, as to how many 
high performers are choosing to separate. We should expect in the military that OBPGRAD 
increases the likelihood of both retention and promotion, and that the average performance 
of those with graduate education is higher than those without additional education. 
2. Affective Traits 
Labor economic theory states that there are wage differentials by occupation. An 
occupational distribution exists which pays higher wages for executive, managerial, 
administrative, and professional jobs and lower wages for operators, handlers, laborers and 
service jobs (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994). The specific breakdown of the occupational fields 
which comprise each category of community are provided in Table II on the following page. 
While all ofthe officers examined in this study are of the same pay grade, this theory can be 
applied in that occupation effects promotion and promotion leads to higher wages. We 
would expect, then, that service and support communities would have a lower probability of 
promotion than combat arms (professionals for which the military was established) and 
aviation related communities (which in the civilian community have higher wages than other 
professionals). 
Differences in promotion rates could also be a result of the differences in education 
and training obtained prior to an officer's commission. We would expect that an individual 
who receives four years of education at a military institution such as the Naval Academy, 
which also teaches,military skills, would be more proficient in their duties and thus be more 
likely to be promoted. Similarly, we would expect the commissioning source with the least 
amount of military training to be the least likely to be promoted. These expectations were 
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Table II. Occupational Community Variable Composition By Occupational Field 
(OCCFLD and Description 
VARIABLE OCCFLD DESCRIPTION 
COMBAT 03X:X Infantry 
08X:X Field Artillery 
18XX Tank and Assault Amphib 
SERVICE OlXX Personnel and Administration 
34XX Audit, Finance and Accounting 
40XX Data Systems 
41XX Marine Corps Exchange 
43X:X Public Affairs 
44XX Legal Services 
46XX Training and Visual Info Support 




26XX Signals Intelligence 
30X:X Supply Admin and Operations 
35X:X Motor Transport 
AVIATION 
SUPPORT 59 XX Electronics Maintenance 
II j6ox:x j Aircraft Maintenance II 
II lnxx I Anti-Air Warfare II 
PILOTS All pilots and Naval Flight 
75XX Officers 
confirmed by North and Smith (1993) in their study on officer accession characteristics and 
promotions to captain and major in the Marine Corps. Holding all else constant, they found 
that Platoon Leaders Class (PLC) and Officer Candidate School (OCS) commissioning 
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sources had consistently lower promotion probabilities for promotion to both captain and 
major. In their analysis they also found that Naval Academy (USNA) graduates had the 
highest probability of promotion, consistent with our assumptions. Additionally, depending 
·on the source of commission, each officer is commissioned as a regular officer or a reserve 
officer with an active duty period of obligation. 1 Officers who were commissioned through 
the Naval Academy, the Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MECEP), and 
those Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) officers who obtained fully-funded 
scholarships received regular commissions whereas those who entered through other 
programs did not. 
The ability to remain on active duty depends on the type of commission. 
Officers with regular commissions can continue indefinitely as long as they are 
promoted. Officers with reserve commissions must apply to be augmented 
into the regular officer corps [at the end of their initial obligation, prior to the 
promotion to 0-4 point] or apply for extensions. Marine augmentation 
boards have been extremely competitive over the past decade and are much 
more than mere formalities, as may be the case in other services. (Theilmann, 
1990) 
In an effort to select the best officers for augmentation, each individual is screened first on 
the unit level and then by the Commanding General of the major subordinate command 
(MSC). Each MSC represents a different occupational interest, e.g., a Marine Division has 
an interest in combat aims, a Marine Air Wing has and interest in aviation, and a Marine 
Service Support Group has an interest in support occupations. These differences in interests 
may lead to differences in the number of officers by occupation who ultimately are 
augmented, stay to the promotion to 0-4 point, and who are eventually promoted. 
1Recently, a policy was implemented which requires that all officers receive a reserve commission, 
but for the pwposes of this study, the difference must be taken into account. 
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3. Demographic Characteristics 
Several individual demographic characteristics should theoretically effect the 
performance measures used in this study, with an individual's age being the first. Labor 
economic theory states that the older an individual is, the less likely that person is to change 
jobs. This should directly impact the retention behavior of Marine Corps officers. Prior 
enlisted officers who are older, on average, when commissioned as compared to officers from 
other commissioning sources should be more likely to remain on active duty. Additionally, 
age is often used to approximate the amount of work experience an individual has. Age-
earnings profiles reflect that those with more work experience have higher earnings. Thus 
older officer's should be more likely to be promoted. 
A second demographic characteristic worth examination is minority status. North and 
Smith (1993) showed that there were indeed performance differences between population 
groups since promotion rates were consistently lower for African-Americans than for whites. 
Several internal studies ensued to evaluate those differences in characteristics and promotion 
by race. One such study, a Master's thesis prepared by Lieutenant Brian Miller (1995) 
examined the estimated affects of minority officer retention behavior based on the recent 
drawdowns in manning levels. He found that African-American Marine Corps officers were 
more likely at every decision point to separate than white officers. Thus, there are statistical 
differences in the promotion and retention of different racial/ethnic groups and these 
differences must be included to examine the independent effects of graduate education on 
performance. Because the data are limited severely in size, the MINORITY variable 
combines all minorities into one category. Even still, only 6.2 percent of the officers in the 
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1980 cohort are minorities, and the number of observations may be too small to achieve any 
level of significance. 
Gender is another important characteristic which must be considered, but may not be 
observable due to the small number of observations. Only 4.8 percent of those officers 
entering the 1980 cohort were women. But, 
... to the extent that discrimination and other institutional factors restrict the 
civilian employment opportunities and potential earnings for women ... their 
cost of leaving will be higher. (Mehay and Bowman, 1995) 
This implies that women would be more likely to stay, unless of course a choice is made to 
assume a traditional role of child rearing. Limited research is available on women officers' 
career decisions in the Marine Corps due to their small numbers in those studies as well, but 
the models in this research will attempt to capture any significant characteristics leading to 
their separation decisions or promotion rates, and the effect of graduate education on their 
performance. This attempt will be accomplished by including the binary variable FEMALE 
as an explanatory variable in the multivariate models. 
Perhaps the most important demographic characteristic of all is an individual's marital 
status. In every study reviewed for this research, marital status was statistically significant 
for retention decisions and promotion, no matter how the variable was created. Not only do 
married men earn more than their non-married counterparts in the civilian sector, suggesting 
a higher level of productivity, they also tend to stay in the military rather than separate in 
comparison with their non-married peers. Economically, "the opportunity costs associated 
with leaving active duty and finding a job are greater for married service members." (Long, 
1992) Socially, officers making stay or leave decisions are making life-cycle decisions. 
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Marriage, as well, is a life-cycle decision, so we can hypothesize that if a service member has 
already made a decision to marry, then that same individual would be more likely to have 
made another life-cycle decision. These same life-cycle choices may reflect certain tastes and 
preferences for the military which could impact individual performance and promotion. Thus, 
MARRIED will be included in both the retention and promotion models to evaluate the effect 
of graduate education on on-the-job performance. 
The final demographic characteristic which will only be included in the retention 
equations described in Chapter V is the general unemployment rate for the United States. 
Previous studies have shown that the civilian work force unemployment rate has an effect on 
an individual's decision to stay or leave the military. If the unemployment rate is high in a 
given year, we would expect that an individual would be more likely to stay in the military; 
whereas, if the unemployment rate is low an individual would be more likely to leave. 
B. THE RELEVANT SAMPLES 
Two data samples were constructed for analysis in this study. First, a sample was 
created of all those officers who entered into the Marine Corps in fiscal year 1980. In order 
to reduce the number of miscellaneous factors influencing promotion to 0-4, the following 
sample restrictions were necessary to ensure homogeneity of the data. First, all warrant 
officers and limited duty officers were eliminated. Second, any officer who entered with a pay 
grade higher than second lieutenant was eliminated, since officers who enter with a paygrade 
higher than 0-1 are generally professionals with direct commissions such as Staff Judge 
Advocates (lawyers). Third, any records with missing variables were eliminated to ensure the 
binary variables created were not skewed. And finally, those officers with no college degrees 
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were eliminated, since education is the focus of this study and the fact that not a single officer 
without a college degree in the sample was promoted to major caused statistical problems 
with the empirical models. Once these restrictions were imposed, the sample contained 1,087 
observations. 
The second sample created is simply a subset of the first. By estimating the promotion 
point to 0-4, the variable STAYPROM was created to indicate that an officer remained on 
active duty long enough to appear before the 0-4 promotion board. This is an approximation, 
since actual promotion board data were not obtained for this study. The promotion model 
is run using this second sample consisting only of those officers who actually stayed to the 
promotion point. Ofthe 1,087 officers who initially entered the 1980 cohort, only 455 stayed 
to the promotion point, and ofthe 455 officers who stayed to the promotion point, 314 were 
promoted to 0-4. The approximation technique appears to be valid, since the promotion rate 
of 69 percent coincides with the average overall promotion rate to major of 67 to 70 percent. 
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IV. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
Before commencing with multivariate analysis, we first examine the data to determine 
if statistically significant differences exist in the variables selected. Table III, provided on the 
following page, reports the difference in the values of the independent variable for all officers
 
who entered in 1980. Each cell provides the mean value for a specific variable with
in its 
category. For example, of those officers who obtained a postgraduate education 
since 
commissioning, their average performance index (A VGPI) is 8. 7045, whereas the A VGPI 
for those officers who did not receive a postgraduate education is 8.3268. This differ
ence 
between groups within the OBPGRAD category is statistically significant to the one pe
rcent 
level (the T statistic is -11.8603). In isolation, we can conclude that officers who receive a 
postgraduate education have a higher average performance level than those who hav
e not 
received a postgraduate education. Other significant differences and conclusions whic
h can 
be drawn from those who have obtained postgraduate education and those who have no
t are 
provided in bullet format below. Officers with postgraduate education are more likely
 to: 
• have a higher average performance level 
• receive a better ranking at TB S 
• have a commissioning source from the Naval Academy or Officer Candidate 
School 
• have an older average age and have a greater proportion of those who are married. 
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Table m. Mean Values of Independent Variables and Their Statistical Significance by 
OBPGRADandSTAYPROM 
Obtained Postgraduate Education Stayed to 0-4 Promotion Point 
VARIABLE Yes No T Stat Yes I ~~632) I T Stat (n=78) (n=1009) (n=4552 
II AVGPI II 8.7045 8.3268 1 -11.8603.. 11 8.6997 8.1071 18.9367** II 
II GCT I 124.4893 122.7957 I -0.5050 II 125.3621 121.2261 2.3288* II 
II COMPRK 79.7191 100.0153 I 3.0507.. 11 86.2220 107.2871 -6.0022** II 
II OBPGRAD -------------- -------------- I ------------- II 0.1476 0.0211 7.8067** II 
II PLC 0.2105 0.3353 I 0.5009 II 0.2953 0.3478 1.9853* II 
II ROTC 0.1158 0.1893 I 1.7816* II 0.2131 0.1634 -2.2359* II 
II ACADEMY II 0.2000 0.1059 I -2.2291*" II 0.1421 0.0922 2.7076** II 
II ocs II 0.3158 0.2385 I -1.6877 II 0.1944 .2793 -3.5156** II 
II ENLCOM -II 0.1474 0.1151 I -0.8559 II 0.1308 0.1080 1.2366 . II 
II COMBAT II 0.2737 0.3445 I 1.4024 II 0.3364 0.3412 -0.1791 II 
II SERVICE II 0.1474 0.0834 I -1.7092* II 0.0897 0.0867 0.1721 II 
II SUPPORT II 0.2526 0.2244 I -0.6093 II 0.2131 0.2358 -0.9626 II 
II AIRS UP II 0.0526 0.0617 I 0.3558 II 0.0616 0.0606 0.0794 II 
II PILOTS II 0.2737 0.2861 I 0.2572 II 0.2991 0.2753 0.9256 II 
II RESERVE II 0.6842 0.7014 I 0.3460 II 0.6336 0.7470 -4.3355** II 
II AGE II 23.8526 23.3495 I -2.2765** II 23.4374 23.3505 -0.8164 II 
II MINORITY II 0.0632 0.0592 I -0.1516 II 0.0449 0.0698 1.8708 II 
II FEMALE II 0.0842 0.0475 I -1.2518 II 0.0449 0.0540 -0.7424 II 
II MARRIED II 0.7895 0.6839 I -2.1469* II 0.8729 0.5639 12.5400** II 
* Significant at the .1 0 level. 
** Significant at the .011evel. 
Officers with a service related occupation represent only 8.34 percent of those who have not 
obtained a postgraduate education, but represent 14.7 4 percent of those with postgraduate 
education, indicating that occupational community is important as well. Minority and female 
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differences were not statistically significant. 
Similar statistical differences exist between those who chose to stay to the 0-4 
promotion point and those who separated. A summary of those statistically significant 
differences is provided in bullet form below. An officer who chooses to stay to the 0-4 
promotion point is more likely to: 
• have a higher average performance level 
• have a higher GCT 
• have a better ranking at TB S 
• haye obtained a postgraduate education (only two percent of those with graduate 
education separated, whereas fourteen percent of those with graduate education 
did stay to the promotion point) 
• have been commissioned through ROTC, ACADEMY, and ENLCOM sources and 
less likely to have been commissioned through PLC or OCS sources 
• be a regular officer (approximately 75 percent of those who did not stay to the 
promotion point received reserve commissions, whereas only 63 percent of those 
who did stay to the promotion point had reserve commissions) 
• not be from a minority group (only four percent of those who stayed to the 
promotion point were minorities) 
• be or have been married 
These preliminary statistics indicate that the hypotheses formulated in Chapter III have valid 
foundations. There are significant differences in the individual characteristics between those 
who obtained postgraduate education and those who stayed to the promotion point, indicating 
that selection bias could be introduced into multivariate models if a method of controlling for 
these differences is not employed. 
The preliminary analysis is not complete, however, until the second sample of only 
those who stayed to the promotion point is examined. Table IV below provides the mean 
values and their significance for only those officers staying to the promotion point and 
Table IV. Mean V aloes of Independent Variables and Their Statistical Significance for 
the Sam pi f 0 I Th St . t th 0 4 P f P . t eo my ose aymg o e - romo Ion om 
Promoted to 0-4 (Stayed to Promotion) 
VARIABLE Yes (N=314) No (N=141) T Stat 
AVGPI 8.7643 8.5577 12.2521"" 
GCT 125.3977 121.9375 1.7852* 
COMPRK 80.5116 98.8141 -3.0062*" 
OBPGRAD 0.1723 0.0941 2.3908** 
PLC 0.3205 0.2412 1.9357" 
ROTC 0.1973 0.2471 -1.2707 
ACADEMY 0.1452 0.1352 0.3052 
ocs 0.2027 0.1765 0.7139 
ENLCOM 0.1260 0.1412 -0.4743 
COMBAT 0.3369 0.3353 0.0385 
SERVICE 0.0795 0.1118 -1.1508 
SUPPORT 0.2082 0.2235 -0.3980 
AIRS UP 0.0603 0.0647 -0.1955 
PILOTS 0.3151 0.2647 1.1840 
RESERVE 0.6492 0.6000 1.0903 
AGE 23.4247 23.4647 0.2117 
MINORITY 0.0438 0.0471 -0.1652 
FEMALE 0.0329 0.0706 -1.9654* 
MARRIED 0.8959 0.8235 2.3472*" 
* Significant at the .1 0 level. 
** Significant at the .011evel. 
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whether promoted to 0-4 or not. Not surprisingly, the differences between the majority of 
the independent variables' mean values have become smaller, and fewer of the independent 
variables are statistically significant. Of those who stayed to the promotion point, those who 
were actually promoted had a higher average performance level, had a higher GCT, and were 
ranked higher at TBS. Only nine percent of those who were not promoted had a 
postgraduate degree, while 17 percent of those who were promoted did have a postgraduate 
degree. Neither commissioning source nor occupational community were statistically 
significant, with the exception that those with a PLC commission did represent a larger 
proportion of those who were promoted than those were not. Differences also existed by 
FEMALE and MARRIED. 
Analysis of both samples suggests that there are positive effects of having obtained 
a postgraduate education on staying to the promotion point and being promoted. To further 
focus the nonparametric analysis toward the question of whether graduate education increases 
performance, it is also necessary to examine the differences in AVGPI by OBPGRAD. Table 
V below looks at the mean differences in A VGPI by OBPGRAD for both the sample of all 
those officers who entered the cohort and those who were promoted to 0-4 and are still on 
active duty as of fiscal year 1994. Not surprisingly, there are large differences in performance 
II Obtained Postgraduate Education 
SAMPLE I! Yes I No I T Stat 
ENTIRE COHORT II 8.7045 I 8.3268 I -11.8603"" 
STAYPROM II 8.7302 I 8.6944 I -1.6007 
**Significant at the .Ollevel 
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between those who obtained a postgraduate degree and those who did not in the sample of 
all those who entered the cohort, but of those who were promoted to 0-4 and who remained 
on active duty, there is no statistical difference in their average performance. To ascertain if 
the positive effects of graduate education on retention and promotion result in increased 
performance, it is now necessary to combine the independent variables in multivariate models 
to isolate the direct effects, if any, of graduate education on performance using the method 
outlined in the following Chapter. 
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V. MULTIVARIATE METHOD AND ANALYSIS 
Several methods of multivariate analysis are available. Simple regression techniques, 
or linear probability models (LPMs ), estimate a linear function based on the sample data from 
which estimated coefficients and their statistical significance can be used to predict an 
outcome. With a binary dependent variable as used in this study, however, LPMs fall short 
because predicted values of the dependent variables can fall either below zero or above one. 
The result is a form of sample truncation. A better approach involves fitting the predicted 
values of the regression estimates in the form of a cumulative distribution function (CDF). 
[T]he CDFs commonly chosen to represent the 0-1 response models are (1) 
the logistic and (2) the normal, the former giving rise to the LOGIT model 
and the latter to the PROBIT (or NORMIT) model. (Gujarati, 1995) 
Use of either approach is acceptable, since there are very minute differences in the statistical 
results (Maddala, 1977). The PROBIT model has been chosen for use in this study. 
Since the majority of the literature reviewed in Chapter II focused on the effects of 
graduate education on promotion, it is first necessary to present a simple promotion model. 
This simple performance model uses the binary variable PROMOTE as the dependent 
variable. Officers promoted to 0-4 are coded as '1 ',otherwise the value is zero. The simple 
promotion model is presented on the following page. As independent variables, COMPRK 
and OBPGRAD are included as measures of cognitive skill; occupational community, 
commissioning source, and type of commission are included as affective traits; and AGE, 
MINORITY, FEMALE, and MARRIED are included as the demographic characteristics. 
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PROMOTE = /( COMPRK, OBPGRAD, COMBAT, SERVICE, 
SUPPORT, PILOTS, ROTC, ACADEMY, OCS, ENLCOM, 
RESERVE, AGE, MINORITY, FEMALE, MARRIED) 
This model is run with the data available for this study to initially compare the results to those 
of previous studies. The initial results of the simple promotion model are provided in Table 
VI below. 
Table VI. PROBIT Estimates, Standard Errors, and Statistical Significance for the 
Simple PROMOTE Model 
[vARIABLE II ESTIMATED
 
COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR TSTATISTIC 
II OBPGRAD II 0.4761"* I 0.1959 2.4294 II 
llcoMPRK II -0.0033"* I 0.0011 -2.8975 II 
II coMBAT II 0.0143 I 0.2837 0.0504 II 
II SERVICE II -0.1443 I 0.3414 -0.4226 II 
II SUPPORT II 0.0082 I 0.2893 0.0283 II 
II PILOTS II 0.0507 I 0.2958 0.1713 II 
II ROTC II -0.3679 I 0.2762 -1.3319 II 
II ACADEMY II -0.2068 I 0.3366 -0.6145 II 
11 ocs II -0.0802 I 0.2065 -0.3885 II 
IIENLCOM II -0.2210 I 0.2805 -0.7880 II 
"RESERVE II -0.0134 I 0.2507 -0.0534 II 
II AGE II -0.0424 I 0.0450 -0.9416 II 
"MINORITY II 0.0139 I 0.2916 0.0476 II 
"FEMALE II- -0.0729 I 0.3561 -0.2046 II 
"MARRIED II 
0.3179" I 0.1909 1.6658 II 
II-2LOGL II 24.3074"* II 
* Significant at the . 1 0 level. 
** Significant at the .01level. 
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As depicted in Table VI, an individual's class ranking at TBS has a significant effect on the 
promotion outcome, and OBPGRAD also has a positive, significant effect on promotion. 
Occupational field, commissioning source, and type of commission have no significant impact 
on the promotion outcome. Similarly, the only demographic characteristic which is significant 
is marital status, with those who have ever been married being more likely to be promoted. 
These results are consistent with previous studies, but it is essential that any potential biases 
as discussed in Chapter II be addressed to obtain the direct effect of the binary variable 
OBPGRAD on both promotion and retention. 
A. MODELING FOR OMITTED VARIABLE BIAS 
One-of the potential biases in the simple promotion model is that an individual's ability 
prior to entering the Marine Corps is never held constant. Those individuals who obtain 
postgraduate education may have a higher level of ability than their peers, and due to their 
higher level of performance may be more likely to be promoted. If this is true, then the value 
of the coefficient for OBPGRAD is overestimated. Another potential bias is the omission of 
an actual measure of on-the-job performance. Those officers who are selected for graduate 
education in the Marine Corps are selected based on their promotability. Thus, their average 
performance may already be higher than their peers, which would account for a higher 
probability of being promoted. Omission, then, of the A VGPI variable can result in 
overestimation of the OBPGRAD coefficient. To analytically test these assumptions, it is 
necessary to run the simple promotion model with GCT, with AVGPI, and with both GCT 
and AVGPI. lfbias does exist, then the coefficients for GCT and A VGPI will be statistically 
significant and the value of the OBPGRAD coefficient should decrease. If those coefficients 
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are not statistically significant, then potential bias does not exist for this sample. Table VII 
below presents the results of all variations of the promotion model. 
Table Vll. PROBIT Estimates and Their Standard Errors for the Promotion to 0-4 
Multivariate Models 
Modell - Simple Model2-GCT Model3- A VGPI Model4 - Both 
Variable 
~ (Std Error) ~ (Std Error) 13 (Std Error) ~ (Std Error) 
OBPGRAD 0.4761(0.1959) .. 0.4776(0.1963)** 0.3909(0.2327)* 0.3873(0.2331)* 
AVGPI -NA- -NA- 6.1487(0.6202)** 6.1695(0.6229)** 
GCT -NA- -0.0017(0.0023) -NA- -0.0021 (0.0026) 
COMPRK -0.0033(0.00 11 )** -0.0034(0.00 12) •• -0.001 0(0.00 13) -0.0013(0.0014) 
COMBAT 0.0143(0.2838) 0.0191(0.2844) 0.2734(0.3393) 0.2837(0.3408) 
SERVICE -0.1443(0.3415) -0.1385(0.3419) 0.0268(0.3952) 0.0362(0.3962) 
SUPPORT 
-
0.0082(0.2893) 0.0221 (0.2903) 0.6107(0.3530) 0.6312(0.3550)* 
PILOTS 0.0507(0.2958) 0.0705(0.2975) 0.1255(0.3481) 0.1504(0.3504) 
ROTC -0.3679(0.2762) -0.3624(0.2765) -0.3 568(0. 3083) -0.351 0(0.3086) 
ACADEMY -0.2068(0.3366) -0.1838(0.3383) 0.0390(0.3838) 0.0706(0.3862) 
ocs -0.0802(0.2065) -0.0726(0.2069) 0.1426(0.2468) 0.1561(0.2479) 
ENLCOM -0.221 0(0.2805) -0.2061 (0.2818) -0.1487(0.3353) -0.1276(0.3378) 
RESERVE -0.0 134(0.2507) -0.0191(0.2511) 0.0306(0.2851) 0.0 195(0.2858) 
AGE -0.0424(0.0450) -0.0412(0.0451) -0.0772(0.0525) -0.0772(0.0526) 
MINORITY 0.0139(0.2916) 0.0124(0.2916) 0.3808(0.3437) 0.3840(0.3442) 
FEMALE -0.0729(0.3561) -0.0929(0.3568) 0.2027(0.4389) 0.1806(0.4389) 
MARRIED 0.3179(0.1909)* 0.3171(0.1910)* 0.0209(0.2349) 0.0184(0.2353) 
-2LOGL 24.3074** 24.8294** 170.9428** 171.5987** 
* Significant at the .1 0 level 
** Significant at the .01 level 
Three phenomena are apparent in assessing the impact of ability and actual performance when 
included in the simple multivariate model promotion model. First, when GCT and AVGPI 
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are included in model, the standard errors of the coefficients of all other variables increase in 
size, reducing their significance. Second, the coefficient of GCT is not significant in models 
2 or 4, while in Models 3 and 4 AVGPI is the single most significant variable in the 
multivariate model. Finally, the coefficient of the OBPGRAD decreases from 0.48 to 0.39. 
Thus, omitting GCT and A VGPI appears to cause the coefficient of OBPGRAD to be 
overestimated. 
There are several ways of assessing the goodness of fit of multivariate models. One 
way is to examine the chi-square value of the log-likelihood statistic (-2LOGL). This method 
tests the null hypothesis that all variables included as explanatory variables in a model are 
simultaneousfy equal to zero. This test is usually considered to be a poor assessment of the 
goodness of fit because multivariate models rarely fail to meet the required confidence level. 
We can, however, compare the level of significance depicted by the -2LOGL value to assess 
if one model predicts the outcome variable better than another model with other explanatory 
variables. Based on this approach to determining the goodness of fit of the models, the 
largest increase in the -2LOGL value occurs when A VGPI is included in Model 3. 
A second method of assessing the goodness of fit of the models is to inspect the 
interrelationships between the variables included in the model. This is accomplished through 
a correlation analysis. If two or more variables are highly correlated with each other, then the 
direct effect on the dependent variable can be obscured. Appendix B provides the correlation 
matrices for each multivariate model presented in this Chapter. This process of assessing 
goodness of fit is also generally a weak measure, since at least some correlation between 
variables will always be present. The ultimate purpose of assessing goodness of fit is to 
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determine if the "true" selection model has been specified with the variables available. By 
examining the promotion model correlation matrix, A VGPI appears to be a reliable variable 
when compared to the others. The largest correlation present is between A VGPI and 
COMPRK of -0.23, and the effects of this relationship can be observed by the lack of 
statistical significance of the CO:MPRK coefficient when AVGPI is included. The correlation 
between A VGPI and OBPGRAD is not statistically significant. Using correlation analysis as 
an approach to measuring goodness of fit also results in the conclusion that the models which 
include A VGPI are best. Actual on-the-job performance is important in the promotion 
outcome, then, while ability as measured by GCT is not. 
B. MO-DELING FOR SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS 
In the preliminary data analysis of Chapter IV, differences between those who 
obtained graduate education and those who did not were significant in both the overall sample 
and the sample of only those who stayed to the promotion to 0-4 point. Then in examining 
potential omitted variable bias, average performance is found to be a significant factor in the 
promotion outcome. But, theoretically average performance should also explain who chooses 
to attend graduate education and who decides to stay to the 0-4 promotion point. Both of 
these potential sample selection biases may affect the promotion outcome and require 
examination. To do so, promotion must be modeled as an ordinary least squares equation, 
and a selection term (Mills' ratio) for each type of bias must be included. This procedure is 
not exactly precise, but it will provide an indication of whether a potential bias may be 
present. 
The first type of potential selection bias deals with the OBPGRAD choice. Marine 
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Corps officers who volunteer are screened for eligibility by Headquarters Marine Corps prior 
to assignment to fully funded graduate education programs. Two types of officers could 
potentially be volunteers: those who desire a graduate education to enhance their 
employment opportunities in the civilian sector once their obligated service is complete, or 
those who desire further education to enhance their performance in their respective 
occupations or the Marine Corps overall. In the screening process at Headquarters Marine 
Corps, officers are selected to graduate education based on their ability, performance, and 
promotability. The goal is for all officers sent to graduate programs to be competitive for 
promotion to the next higher grade to ensure that the officers will be able to fulfill their 
incurred obligated service. Thus, one potential sample selection bias could be that the 
coefficient of OBPGRAD is overestimated in the simple promotion model due to the fact that 
the group of officers selected for OBPGRAD are more promotable by virtue of the selection 
process. 
The second potential sample selection bias could involve differences in characteristics 
between those who stay to the promotion point and those who do not. Table III in Chapter 
IV provides clear evidence that this may be the case. Only two percent of those who did not 
stay to the promotion point obtained a postgraduate education, while 14 percent of those who 
did stay to the promotion point had graduate education. Their AVGPI, GCT, COMPRK, 
commissioning source, type of commission, and marital status also have statistically 
significant differences. Two principal possibilities exist for those who separate prior to the 
promotion point. First, an officer who is an outstanding performer may separate since better 
opportunities exist in the civilian sector. Second, officers who are aware that they have a 
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lower perfonnance level than their peers may choose to separate prior to the promotion point, 
anticipating non-selection. Those with graduate education may only stay to the promotion 
point as a result of the incurred obligated service. Each of these biases require that the same 
individual's choices and characteristics be measured and analyzed over time. 
To measure the effect of graduate education on perfonnance while controlling for 
these two potential sample selection biases, separate selection models must be specified and 
a sequence of models is necessary. This sequencing of models is done in a two stage 
procedure commonly called the Heckman Procedure (Heckman, 1979), which only the 
PRO BIT software is capable of accomplishing. In the first stage, a PROBIT model is run 
with the suspected source ofbias as the dependent variable. At least one of the independent 
variables included in that first stage specification must be unrelated to the dependent variable 
of the second stage ordinary least squares (OLS) model. When the first stage is run, in 
addition to providing the normal estimated coefficients and their statistical significance, a 
correction factor is generated that encompasses those unobserved factors left in the error 
tenn. This correction factor is an inverse :Mills' ratio. A second stage OLS model is then run 
with the promotion to 0-4 outcome as the dependent variable and includes as independent 
variables the inverse Mills' ratio, the. suspected source of bias variable, and the other 
constructed variables which theoretically effect the dependent variable. The use of a PRO BIT 
model is not possible in the second stage due to excessive correlation of the error term 
resulting from using the same functional form in both stages. When the range of the 
dependent variable is restricted between 0 and 1, the curves produced in both stages are 
almost identical and the estimates of the coefficients are biased. To avoid this problem, OLS 
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allows the binary dependent variable to be continuous, expanding beyond 1 and below 0. 
1. The OBPGRAD Selection Model and Results 
To answer the questions under analysis in this study, a model must first be specified 
which predicts whether an individual participates in graduate education or not. By doing so, 
the inverse Mills' ratio can be included in the promotion performance model to control for 
potential biases from sample selection. The graduate education selection model is: 
OBPGRAD = /(AVGPI, GCT, COMPRK, ROTC, ACADEMY, OCS, 
ENLCOM, MINORITY, FEMALE, MARRIED) 
This model assumes that four selection factors are involved with choosing postgraduate 
~ducation. One factor is that to be selected for graduate education an officer must be 
promotable, and AVGPI is the principal component for determining whether an officer is 
promotable. The second factor is that an individual must meet the eligibility requirements for 
attendance at a graduate level institution. GCT, COMPRK, and source of commission 
variables are used to proxy an individual officer's ability. The third factor is that to apply for 
graduate education while in the military requires that additional obligated service be incurred. 
Finally, the graduate education choice is a personal one, and individuals from different 
backgrounds (MINORITY, FEMALE) or who have made other life-cycle choices such as 
marriage may have different effects on thegraduate education choice. To continue to test for 
omitted variable bias, the OBPGRAD selection model will be run three times. 
Table VIII on the following page presents the results of the multivariate PROBIT 
model with OBPGRAD as the dependent variable. During the execution of the program a 
selection bias correction term (MILLS 1) is produced for use in the second stage OLS 
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Table VIII. PROBIT Estimates and their Standard Errors for the OBPGRAD 
Selection Model 
Modell - Simple Model2-GCT Model3- AVGPI Model4 - Both 
Variable 
13 (Std Error) . 13 (Std Error) 13 (Std Error) 13 (Std Error) 
AVGPI -NA- -NA- 1.5259(0.2858)*" 1.5257(0.2858)"* 
GCT -NA- -0.0005(0.0022) -NA- -0.0001(0.0024) 
COlvfPRK -0.0038(0.0011)"" -0.0038(0.0011)*" -0.0017(0.00 12) -0.0017(0.0012) 
ROTC 0.3217(0.2891) 0.3224(0.2890) 0.2494(0.3026) -0.2498(0.3027) 
ACADEMY 1.0369(0.3403)*" 1.0450(0.3426)"" 0.9394(0.3531)*" 0.9413(0.3557)"" 
ocs 0.2598 (0.1764) 0.2614(0.1766) 0.2833(0.1890) 0.2837(0.1893) 
ENLCOM 0.114(:)(0.2516) 0.1199(0.2528) 0.1057(0.2741) 0.1070(0.2754) 
MINORITY 0.2159(0.2452) 0.2130(0.2456) 0.3149(0.2684) 0.3143(0.2687) 
FEMALE 0.4819(0.2575)"" 0.4823(0.2575)*" 0.5303(0.2730)* 0.5302(0.2730)* 
MARRIED o.3332(o 1491 r· 0.3336(0.1491)"" 0.0992(0.1641) 0.0992(0.1641) 
-2LOGL 44.2431"" 44.2866"" 88.8628"" 88.8648"" 
* Significant at the .I 0 level 
** Significant at the .Ollevel 
promotion model. Not surprisingly, an officer's average performance, commission source 
from the Naval Academy, and gender are statistically significant in all four models ofthe 
choice to obtain postgraduate education. An officer's composite ranking at TBS and marital 
status appear to be positive and significant in models 1 and 2, but when A VGPI is included 
in models 3 and 4 their coefficients deflate significantly. GCT had no statistical significance 
on the choice to obtain postgraduate education in any of the models in which it was included. 
These results indicate that, for the 1980 cohort, better performers are more likely to choose 
or be selected to obtain graduate education, an officer's commissioning source can contribute 
to the selection, and female officers are more likely than men to obtain graduate education. 
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The chi-square -2LOGL value of 88.86 in models 3 and 4 indicates goodness-of-fit 
of either model. Also, upon review of the correlation matrix provided, the only significant 
correlation between the independent variables exists between A VGPI, COMPRK, and 
MARRIED. Since the standard errors of the COMPRK and MARRIED variables did not 
inflate, no evidence is present which would cause multicollinearity problems in the reliability 
of the coefficient estimates. The selection equation for the potential OBPGRAD bias is 
complete, and it is now necessary to continue with the examination of retention and 
promotion. 
2. The STAYPROM Selection Model and Results 
The-purpose of the retention model is twofold. First, the direct effect of graduate 
education on retention as a measure of performance can be obtained by including OBPGRAD 
as an independent variable in the retention equation. Second, a second selection bias 
correction term, different from the first which was obtained for the potential OBPGRAD 
selection bias, can be obtained to control for the potential bias in the promotion outcome 
from an individual's retention decision. The retention model is: 
STA YPROM = /(AVGPI, COMPRK, OBPGRAD, COMBAT, SERVICE, SUPPORT 
PILOTS, ROTC, ACADEMY, OCS, ENLCOM, RESERVE, 
AGE, MINORITY, FEMALE, MARRIED, UNEMP) 
As evidenced in the OBPGRAD and simple promotion models, A VGPI has been the most 
significant explanatory variable, so an effort must be made to ascertain whether the effect of 
A VGPI is increasing the variance of the other explanatory variables such that their 
significance is diminished. To distinguish the effect of including A VGPI, the STA YPROM 
models will also be run with and without the A VGPI variable. The assumptions for the causal 
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variables e:ffi ecting the retention decision are very similar to those in the graduate education 
selection m odel, with the exception that UNE.MP and AGE are included as independent 
variables si nee they are theoretical contributors to the retention decision but not to the 
graduate ed ucation decision, and GCT is excluded. Table IX provided below presents the 
Table IX. 
Selection M 
PRO BIT Estimates and Their Standard Errors for the STA YPROM 
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Coefficient Standard Error 
II 0.8632"" 0.2687 II 
II 2.0479"" 0.2558 II 
II 
0.0024" 0.0010 II 
II 
0.1977 I 0.2630 II 
II 0.2605 0.3189 II 
II 0.1594 0.2695 II 
II 
-0.1432 0.2632 II 
II 0.1365 0.2897 II 
II 0.0836 0.3361 II 
II -0.0826 0.1787 II 
II 0.4037 0.2768 II 
II -0.0693 0.2708 II 
II 0.0491 0.0444 II 
II -0.0021 0.2557 II 
II -0.0604 0.2849 II 
II 0.6395 .. 0.1384 II 
II 
-32.8769 .. I 2.9699 II 
II 851.2565"" II 
results of the PROBIT STAYPROM selection models. During the execution of the program 
a selection bias correction term (MILLS2) is produced for use in the second stage OLS 
promotion model. As expected, OBPGRAD and MARRIED are positive and significant in 
both models, while UNEMP and COMPRK are negative and significant determinants in 
staying to the 0-4 promotion point in both models as well. A VGPI, when included in model 
2, is once again a statistically significant factor. The higher an individual's performance, the 
more likely the individual will stay to the 0-4 promotion point. Inclusion of the A VGPI 
variable does cause inflation of the standard errors and reduces the coefficient values of the 
other independent variables in the model, but does not severely effect their statistical 
significance. It appears that in the retention decision, the unemployment rate is the single 
most important factor. Neither occupational community nor commissioning source are 
statistically significant on the retention decision in either model; additionally, AGE, 
MINORITY status, and being FEMALE are also not significant. Because the -2LOGL values 
are greater in model 1 than 2, the model including AVGPI better predicts obtaining a 
postgraduate education and staying to the 0-4 promotion point and will be used to generate 
the MILLS2 error correction term. 
3. The OLS Second Stage PROMOTE Model and Results 
This final performance model still uses the binary variable PROMOTE as the 
dependent variable, although the OLS method will allow its values to exceed the range 
between 0 and 1. This model will be run four separate times. Since the OLS method will 
provide substantially different estimates of the coefficients than the PROBIT method, the 
simple promotion model will be run once without using A VGPI and once with A VGPI 
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included. The OLS PRO MOlE model will then be run once with the addition of the selection 
bias correction term from the graduate education selection model (MILLS 1 ), and once 'with 
the addition of the selection bias correction term from the retention selection model 
(MILLS2). The fully specified promotion model, excluding the selection bias correction 
terms, is as depicted on page 3 8 ofthis Chapter. 
In order to assess the direct effect of obtaining a postgraduate education on 
promotion, comparison of the four different models is necessary. Table X provided on the 
following page is presented to easily compare the results of all four models. Chapter III 
outlines the theoretical rationale for including the variables listed in the multivariate equation. 
If either MILLS 1 or MILLS2 are statistically significant, then selection bias can be considered 
to be present. 
The best way to discuss the results in Table X is to compare the OLS results with the 
simple PROBIT promotion model results presented in Table VII. In the first model of Table 
X and the second model of Table VII, which do not include A VGPI, both COMPRK and 
OBPGRAD are statistically significant. MARRIED is significant in the PROBIT model, but 
is not significant in the OLS model. Then, when A VGPI is included in those models 
COMPRK loses its significance, while OBPGRAD still remains positive and significant on 
promotion. MARRIED is not significant in either the PROBIT or OLS promotion model 
when AVGPI is included. In the PROBIT model, SUPPORT has a significant positive effect 
on promotion, but is not significant in the OLS model. Inversely, ROTC is not significant in 
the PROBIT model, but is negative and significant in the OLS model. Overall, the significant 
variables and the direction of their effect are quite consistent. 
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Table X. OLS Estimates and Their Standard Errors for the Second Stage Promotion 
to 0-4 Multivariate Models 
Modell Model2 Model3 Model4 
Variable 
B (Std Error) ~ (Std Error) 13 (Std Error) ~ (Std Error) 
OBPGRAD 0.1458(0.0618)** 0.0919(0.0523)* -0.4483(0.4513) -0.0818(0.0318)*" 
AVGPI -NA- 1.5341 (0.1152)** 1.6853(0.1703)** -0.2357(0.0929)** 
GCT -0.0006(0.0008) -0.0004(0.0007) -0.0004(0.0007) -0.0005(0.0004) 
CO:MPRK. -0.0012(0.0004)** -0.0002(0.0003) -0.0003(0.0004) -0.0006(0.0002)** 
COMBAT 0.0067(0.0983) 0.0493(0.0831) 0.0528(0.0831) 0.0166(0.0495) 
SERVICE -0.0514(0.1192) -0.0121 (0.1 007) -0.0096(0.1007) -0.0567(0.0560) 
SUPPORT 0.0096(0.1 006) 0.1216(0.0854) 0.1262(0.0854) 0.0111(0.0510) 
PILOTS 0.0204(0.1024) 0.0248(0.0865) 0.0282(0.0865) 0.0986(0.0516)* 
ROTC -0.1214(0.0959) -0.1399(0.081 O)* -0.1589(0.0825)* -0.1745(0.0483)** 
ACADEMY -0.0569(0.1170) -0.0591(0.0988) -0.0198(0.1040) -0.1701 (0.0589)** 
ocs -0.0259(0.0691) 0.0308(0.0585) 0.0775(0.0702) 0.0358(0.0349)* 
ENLCOM -0.0698(0.0957) -0.0241 (0.0809) -0.0007 (0.0831) -0.0978(0.0482)* 
RESERVE -0.0041 (0.0877) -0.0478(0.0741) -0.0577(0.0745) -0.0794(0.0441 )** 
AGE -0.0 135(0.0 154) -0.0198(0.0130) -0.0203(0.0 130) -0.0236(0.0077) 
MINORITY -0.0040(0.1003) 0.0509(0.0848) 0.0925(0.0915) 0.0566(0.0505) 
FEMALE -0.0365(0.1275) 0.0396(0.1 078) 0.1200(0.1268) 0.0224(0.0642) 
MARRIED 0.1 078(0. 0680) 0.0129(0.0578) 0.0196(0.0581) -0.1675(0.0350)** 
MILLS! --------------------- --------------------- 0.2806(0.2328) ----------------------
MILLS2 --------------------- --------------------- ------------------------ -0.8233(0.0292)** 
FVALUE 1.529* 12.444** 11.845** 77.426** 
* Significant at the . 1 0 level 
** Significant at the .Ollevel 
When controlling for potential selection bias due to the graduate education decision 
in model 3 of Table X, quite different results emerge. A VGPI is still positive and significant, 





significance of the ~LSI coefficient, however, may indicate that who chooses OBPGRAD 
is not an important factor in the promotion outcome. The coefficient of OBPGRAD is no
t 
significant, and the standard error is quite large. The standard error increases from 0.05 in 
model 2 to 0. 45 in model 3. .MILLS 1 and OBPGRAD are significantly correlated with each 
other such that .MILLS 1 may explain more about the graduate education decision than
 
OBPGRAD itself This suggests that the OBPGRAD selection model used in the first stage
 
of this analysis is poorly specified. In order to further investigate the potential bias in the
 
coefficient of OBPGRAD due to the fact that individuals are not randomly selected to attend
 
graduate education, it is important to better specifY the graduate education selection equation.
 
Future research should focus on this problem. 
When controlling for potential selection bias due to the stay or leave decision in model 
4 of Table X, quite different results emerge as well. The retention selection bias correction 
term ~LS2 is significant in model4 of Table X, so examining the OBPGRAD coefficient, 
its direction, and significance is key to determining the direct effects of OBPGRAD on
 
promotion. When .MILLS2 is included, OBPGRAD has a significant negative effect on the
 
probability of promotion to 0-4. In this model, as opposed to the model with .MILLS I, there
 
is no significant problem with the inflation of the standard errors of the coefficients. The only
 
significant correlation exists between the A VGPI and MILLS2 variable, but the correlation
 
coefficient of 0. 48 is much smaller than the 0. 98 correlation coefficient observed between
 
OBPGRAD and MILLS 1 in model 3. The A VGPI variable changes sign, but remains
 
significant. Superficially, the coefficient of A VGPI looks suspect, but theoretically, if more
 
officers stay to the promotion point, the mean average performance of those promoted would
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slightly decrease towards the mean of the entire cohort. Similarly, if more officers stay to the 
promotion point and do not have graduate education, then the probability that an individual 
with graduate education will be promoted should decline. Additional results, when 
controlling for potential retention selection bias, i.e., remembering that graduate education 
carries with it an additional obligated service commitment, are summarized below: 
• COMPRK is statistically significant even when A VGPI is included 
• PILOTS are more likely to be promoted than other occupations 
• ROTC, ACADEMY, and ENLCOM are less likely to be promoted than other 
commissioning sources 
• RESERVE and MARRIED are less likely to be promoted than those with regular 
commission types and officers who have never been married 
One of the confounding factors involved in the STAYPROM selection model is that 
officers who obtain a postgraduate degree incur an additional obligated service commitment 
of up to four years. Because of this additional commitment, officers with graduate education 
should be more likely to stay to the promotion point. Additionally, because more officers 
with graduate education stay to the promotion point, they may or may not be more likely to 
be promoted. Table XI on the following page presents the retention rates to the promotion 
point, the promotion rates to 0-4, and the retention rates to year 14 (the last year ofthe 
cohort obtained) for the samples of those with and without graduate education. In Table XI, 
the significantly higher retention rates to the 0-4 point for those with graduate education 
compared to the lower retention rates after the 0-4 point suggest that there may be potential 
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Table XI. Retention and Promotion Rates for Three Samples as Categorized by 
Graduate Ed f S b uca Ion u 1group 
Graduate Education 
Rates by Sample Yes (N=95) I No (N=1294) 
II Retention Rate to 0-4 Point 83.16% 38.03% 
II Promotion Rate at 0-4 Point 78.48% 65.13% 
Retention Rate after 0-4 Point 90.32% 93.94% 
retention selection bias which could result in an overestimate of the OBPGRAD coefficient 
in the promotion model. 
Making definitive conclusions from these models, however, must be cautious. First 
of all, using OLS in the second stage expands the binary PROMOTE variable into a 
continuous variable, which can result in a form of truncation bias. Values of the coefficients 
can exceed one and be below zero, when in reality this cannot be the case. There are several 
more sophisticated techniques to control for the correlation between the error terms of the 
first and second stages of the sequential models which would allow for examination of the 
specific marginal effects of each independent variable. The only conclusions which may be 
drawn from the techniques used in this research are general in nature. Only the direction of 
the potential bias can be addressed. Additionally, it is difficult to determine exactly what the 
coefficient of the MILLS2 term tells us other than that it accounts for the unexplained 
variance in the retention model. Since MILLS2 is significant, though, there is cause to believe 
that the effects of retention are significant and must be addressed. Table XII on the following 
page provides a recapitulation of the results of this Chapter specifically with regard to the 
coefficient of the OBPGRAD variable. Table XII clearly shows general trends, even though 
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the values of the coefficients are quite different. In all models, the value of the coefficient of 
OBPGRAD decreases when average performance is included. This trend is also consistent 
Table Xll. Comparison of the OBPGRAD Coefficient by Type of Performance Model 
and Avera P ri V · bl e e ormance ana e 
Average Performance 
Type of Performance Model Not Included Included 
PRO BIT Simple PROMOTE Model 0.48 .. 0.39"" 
PRO BIT STA YPROM Model 1.07 .. 0.86"" 
OLS Simple PROMOTE Model 0.15 .. 0.09" 
OLS PROMOTE with MILLS 1 2.84 .. -0.45 
OLS PROMOTE with MILLS2 -0.07"* -o.o8·· 
* Significant at the .1 0 level 
**Significant at the .Ollevel 
in the second stage OLS promotion models. The consistency provides sufficient reason to 
infer that in estimating the effect of graduate education on promotion, it is necessary to be 
concerned with potential biases due to omitted variables (such as cognitive ability or actual 
on-the-job performance), and issues relating to selection to graduate education and retention. 
Overall, it is not surprising that in the PROMOTE models intelligence, commissioning 
source, occupational community, and other demographic characteristics are not consistently 
significant in the promotion outcome. We would expect that the promotion process selects 
officers for promotion based on actual performance, given that the individual has stayed to 
the promotion point, and not based on the categorization of the individual officer. Other 
studies as discussed in Chapter II found that demographic characteristics did affect retention 
and promotion outcomes; they did not, however, take into account that actual on-the-job 
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performance is the principal factor in determining performance outcomes. If performance 
data were available, and correction techniques for potential omitted variable and selection 
biases were employed, perhaps comparable results with this study would be obtained. 
Hopefully, all studies in the future will include an actual measure of performance. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this research show the complex interrelationships between the 
performance measures of promotion and retention, especially when trying to focus on the 
effects of a specific independent variable, in this case the effect of OBPGRAD. The results 
do show that there is a common denominator throughout. This common variable is an 
individual's actual on-the-job performance as measured in this study by A VGPI. Examining 
nonparametric statistics, officers who have obtained a postgraduate degree since commission 
do have a higher average performance index than those who have not obtained a postgraduate 
degree. 
By first specifYing and running a simple PRO BIT promotion model, subsequent tests 
were performed to determine if potential omitted variable and sample selection biases were 
present. AVGPI and GCT were first included, and the effect of obtaining a postgraduate 
degree was significantly reduced in the promotion to major (PROMOTE) model. A VGPI 
was found to be the most significant variable in predicting promotion, and its omission was 
shown to overestimate the effect ofOBPGRAD on the performance outcome. Two PROBIT 
models were then specified to determine the other performance measures of obtaining a 
postgraduate education (OBPGRAD) and staying to the promotion point (STA YPROM). 
These models also were run with and without A VGPI as an explanatory variable, and the 
effect of OBPGRAD was again reduced. Knowing that each performance measure was linked 
to A VGPI and other interdependent variables, further analysis was conducted through the use 
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of a final series of OLS promotion models. The first OLS was a simple model identical to the 
PROBIT specification. The second included A VGPI, and consistent results confirmed that 
not including A VGPI leads to an omitted variable bias in the estimated effect of OBPGRAD 
on promotion. The third model was run with a correction term for the potential OBPGRAD 
selection bias. While the correction term was not significant, the coefficient of OBPGRAD 
did decrease and became insignificant in the promotion model. Finally, a last model was run 
with a correction term for the potential STA YPROM selection bias. This time, the correction 
term was significant and the OBPGRAD coefficient did decrease such that it changed signs 
while it still remained significant. The consistency of the direction of these results suggests 
that failure to correct for retention and selection issues biases the effect of OBPGRAD 
upward. 
The results of the simple promotion and retention models are consistent with several 
prior studies on USN and USMC officers, but the inclusion of the selection bias correction 
terms results in contradictory findings. One possible explanation is that the data used for the 
majority of those studies was cross-sectional and did not accurately predict the characteristics 
associated with the retention decision. Several of those studies which did use longitudinal, 
cohort data did not focus their research on the direct effects of postgraduate education; 
rather, the postgraduate variable was simply included as an explanatory variable in either 
promotion or retention models. Those studies which did examine postgraduate education 
exclusively often did not include an actual on-the-job performance measure and did not 
employ the statistical method applied in this study. As we have seen, postgraduate education 
did have a positive, significant effect on promotion and retention when no effort to control 
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for potential selection bias was taken. Another plausible explanation is that quite possibly, 
differences between services may exist between the Navy and Marine Corps, since selection 
procedures for graduate education are distinctly different. For the Navy, attending the Naval 
Postgraduate School is an option for most junior officers and is strongly encouraged, while 
for the Marine Corps, attendance is based on a voluntary, more selective basis for a 
substantially smaller number of individuals. 
Other variables, which do have a theoretical economic basis for possibly effecting the 
outcome of performance measures were found not to be statistically significant in this study. 
The military is a hierarchal organization with no lateral entry, and promotion is principally 
linked to the time in service an officer has served. Thus, many economic principles may not 
apply to studies conducted on the military, especially the United States Marine Corps. To 
best determine the impact of a program such as graduate education, this study confirms that 
it is necessary to ascertain first what type of individual chooses graduate education, to assess 
the impact of those same characteristics on retention decisions, and then to analyze the 
performance outcome of promotion. To conduct a study on measures of on-the-job 
performance in any other sequence could result in substantially biased conclusions. 
The purpose ?f this st':ldy was not to determine the specific marginal benefits of 
graduate education, but rather to determine the direction of the effect when the interaction 
of retention decisions was taken into account in the analysis of the promotion outcome. 
Some advocates may argue that controlling for potential selection bias due to the retention 
decision is not necessary to analyze future promotion points, after all, retention is primarily 
an individual_ decision, and the pyramid grade structure of the Marine Corps is such that it is 
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desirable to have officers separate. Yet, these skeptics may fail to understand the manpower 
process as it applies to manpower and personnel programs and policies. The results of this 
study demonstrate that some programs and policies are working rather well. The fact that an 
officer's GCT and occupational community are not consistently significant in the 
STAYPROM or PROMOTE models indicates that the 'quality spread' program at TBS may 
be working. Intelligent and motivated individuals are being assigned to occupations equally 
which results in the similarity in performance outcomes. Additionally, the fact that individual 
demographic characteristics are not significant suggests that promotion boards are doing a 
superb job at selecting individual's based on their actual on-the-job performance rather than 
age or sex. None of these conclusions could be made if the retention selection bias had not 
been included in the analysis. 
The disturbing result of this study is that graduate education programs in general 
appear to be resulting in a lower predicted probability of promotion even though those with 
graduate education actually perform better. If the desire is to increase performance through 
education, then steps must be taken to improve retention and promotion through changes to 
existing programs and policies. Based on the current graduate education programs and the 
findings of this study, one could hypothesize that the magnitude of the negative impact on 
retention and promotion is even greater for later years of service (beyond twelve years) and 
higher pay grades (lieutenant colonel and above). 
These results apply solely to the cohort of officers who entered the Marine Corps in 
1980. Prior studies discussed in Chapter II have shown that there are differences in 
characteristics by cohort, so generalizing these results to the entire population of officers in 
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the Marine Corps would be inappropriate. In recent years the military has changed its focus 
on the importance of graduate education and the results for more recent cohorts may be 
completely different. 
The next logical step in future research would be to attempt more difficult, 
sophisticated techniques to determine precisely what the marginal effects of the independent 
variables may be. Future research should invesitigate the effect of graduate education using 
bivariate PROBIT or instrumental variable techniques. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
The results of this study show significant patterns for the cohort obtained, however, 
the size of the data sample and the contents severely limited the full analysis of explanatory 
variables which have a theoretical basis for inclusion in the multivariate models. 
Unfortunately, previous studies have shown that there are significant differences between 
cohorts, and this study could not address those issues, since comprehensive data has not 
logically been stored in longitudinal structure prior to 1986. Also, several theoretical 
variables could not be included in the models due to the lack of information available in the 
data sample obtained. The fitness report file did not contain reporting occasion information, 
nor did it contain an officer's ranking amongst his or her peers, important information which 
has been used for several years. Without reporting occasion information, it was not possible 
to construct a performance variable to document the before and after treatment effects. For 
example, it would be beneficial to identify the year an officer achieves a graduate degree, 
match that year with the fitness report file, and construct the level of performance before 
receiving a degree and after receiving one. 
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As witnessed by the lack of significance of the MlLLSl selection bias correction term, 
more information is necessary to specify a more predictive model to determine who actually 
chooses OBPGRAD. Also, information such as college grade point average, type of major, 
and information about the graduate education institution would be helpful. This research only 
examined graduate education in general, but there are three types of which each could have 
different effects on performance outcomes. Officers who are selected to the fully funded 
special education program, for example, may be a substantially different group of individuals 
than those who attain a graduate degree using tuition assistance and attending classes in the 
evening on their own time. A more predictive OBPGRAD selection equation is necessary to 
determine the effects of potential selection bias. 
Additionally, other factors must be examined which were not available for this study. 
The amount of time an officer spends in his or her MOS should reveal possible changes for 
graduate education programs. Currently, officers who receive a fully funded graduate degree 
are not in their primary MOS for about five years (two years obtaining the education, and 
three years serving in billet requiring the graduate degree). These billets are not usually in the 
operational community, so the amount of time officers have served in the FMF should also 
be examined. FinallJ:, the point in time an officer acquires postgraduate education is 
important. As discussed in Chapter I, officers in the Marine Corps who desire to make their 
service a career must follow a general career path to be successful. Attending graduate 
education and serving in a pay-back tour remove them from that career path. Thus, the year 
graduate education is obtained and the type of degree, whether similar to one's MOS or not, 
are importa~t. Obviously, an officer with a combat arms MOS who obtains an engineering 
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degree and serves in an engineering billet, while his peers in the FMF are serving as company 
commanders, will lose some proficiency in his primary occupation. An officer with a support 
MOS such as Disbursing Officer who receives a degree in financial management, on the other 
hand, should be able to perform as well or better than his peers without graduate education. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Two principal recommendations result from the findings and limitations of this study. 
One is that future studies on the effect of graduate education be conducted which include: 
• Differentiation between the type of graduate education received compared to the 
officer's occupational specialty to determine if the effects are general or firm 
~pecific in nature, 
• More than one cohort to assess the differences in performance measures and 
program effects over time, 
• A focus on the time an officer spends in his or her MOS as well as how much time 
in the operating forces the individual has prior to and after receiving graduate 
education and the subsequent effect on promotion to higher grades, and 
• Analysis of the effects of graduate education on promotion to 0-5 and above, 
while including a correction term for potential selection bias due to the retention 
decision. 
The second recommendation is that data sources be improved to consolidate service 
related information. During the data collection for this thesis, it was discovered that every 
variable necessary for analysis was originated and stored by a different organizational sponsor. 
Promotion information is maintained by the promotion branch, performance information is 
maintained by the performance branch, and so on. Additionally, files are separated between 
those who are on active duty and those who have separated, and those who have separated 
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are generally stored by the year separated. Often times the variables stored on those who are 
on active duty and those who have separated are very different. To conduct proper analyses 
in the future, it is necessary that separation files and active duty files be combined, and 
information from different organizational sponsors should be consolidated into a master file 
as well. 
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APPENDIX A. DATASET VARIABLES AND THEIR DEFINITIONS 
# Variable Type Len Pos Label 
25 AAE80-94 Num 
835 AAE L Num 
9 2 8 ACADRK Num 
932 ACADTHRD Num 
53 AFRS80-94 Char 
26 AGE80-94 Num 
836 AGE L Num 
901 AIRSUP Num 







936 AVGB13C Num 
937 AVGB13D Num 
938 AVGB13E Num 
939 AVGB13F Num 
940 AVGB13G Num 
941 AVGB14A Num 
942 AVGB14B Num 
943 AVGB14C Num 
944 AVGB14D Num 
945 AVGB14E Num 
946 AVGB14F Num 
947 AVGB14G Num 
948 AVGB14H Num 
949 AVGB14I Num 
950 AVGB14J Num 
951 AVGB14K Num 
952 AVGB14L Num 
953 AVGB14M Num 
954 AVGB14N Num 
933 AVGPI Num 












BASDDY L Num 
BASDM080-94Num 
BASDMO L Num 
BASDYR80-94Num 






849 COMP L Num 
8 
2 55 AGE AT ENTRY 
2 2035 
8 2580 ACADEMIC CLASS STANDING AT TBS 
8 2606 ACADEMIC TBS PLACEMENT BY THIRD 
2 128 AIR FORCE RECORD STATUS 
2 57 AGE AT SEPARATION/AS-OF-DATE 
2 2037 
8 2412 60, 66, 72 AND 73 
2 126 ARMY LATEST TRANSACTION CODE 























16 2532 NUMBER AND TYPE OF PERSONAL AWARDS 





















BASIC ACTIVE SERVICE DATE - MONTH 
BASIC ACTIVE SERVICE DATE - YEAR 
COMPETITIVE CATEGORY 
ENTERED AND STILL IS COLLEGE GRADUATE 
COLLEGE MAJOR BY TYPE 
03, 08 AND 18 
SERVICE COMPONENT 
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# Variable Type Len Pes Label 













































csvc L Num 
DDOC80-94 Num 
DDOC L Num 
DEPS80-94 Num 
DEPS L Num 
DMOS80-94 Char 
DMOS L Char 
DOBDAY80-94Num 
DOBDAY L Num 
DOBM080-94Num 
DOBMO L Num 
DOBYR80-94Num 
DOBYR L Num 
DOEM080-94Num 
DOEMO L Num 
DOEYR80-94Num 
DOEYR L Num 
DORM080-94Num 
DORMO L Num 
DORYR80-94Num 
DORYR L Num 
DPOC80-94 Num 
DPOC L Num 
DSOC80-94 Num 
DSOC L Num 
DUTLOC80-94Num 
DUTLOC L Num 
EDCERT80-94Num 
EDCERT L Num 
EDLEV80-94Num 
EDLEV L Num 
ETH80-94 Num 
ETH L Num 
ETSM080-94Num 
ETSMO L Num 
ETSYR80-94Num -
ETSYR L Num 
FEMALE Num 
FSB0-94 Num 





10 HOR80-94 Num 
820 HOR L Num 
20 HYEC80-94 Num 
830 HYEC L Num 
5 ISC80-94 Num 





















































































OVERALL TBS PLACEMENT BY THIRD 
CHARACTER OF SERVICE 
DOD DUTY OCCUPATION CODE 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS 
DUTY MOS,AFSC,RATING/NEC 
DATE OF BIRTH - DAY 
DATE OF BIRTH - MONTH 
DATE OF BIRTH - YEAR 
DATE OF ENTRY INTO OFFICER RANKS-MONTH 
DATE OF ENTRY INTO OFFICER RANKS-YEAR 
DATE OF CURRENT RANK - MONTH 
DATE OF CURRENT RANK - YEAR 
DOD PRIMARY OCCUPATION CODE 





ETS DATE - MONTH 
ETS DATE - YEAR 
FLYING STATUS 
8 2513 GENERAL CLASSIFICATION TEST SCORE 
8 2484 ENTERED WITH GRADUATE LEVEL DEGREE 
2 2 5 HOME OF RECORD 
2 2005 
2 45 HIGHEST YEAR OF EDUCATION COMPLETED 
2 2025 
3 12 INTER-SERVICE SEPARATION CODE 
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# Variable Type Len Pas Label 



























906 NOCOLDEG Num 
907 OBCOLDEG Num 
909 OBPGRAD Num 
41 OESC80-94 Num 
851 OESC L Num 
46 PEBDDY80-94Num 
856 PEBDDY L Num 
45 PEBDM080-94Num 
855 PEBDMO L Num 
44 PEBDYR80-94Num 
854 PEBDYR L Num 
50 PEC80-94 Char 
861 PEC L Char 
9 PG80-94 Num 
819 PG L 





































RACE L Num 
RESERVE Num 
RETH80-94 Num 
RETH L Num 
SEP CODE Char 
SEPDAY L Num 
838 SEPMO L 



















LEADERSHIP CLASS STANDING AT TBS 
ANY OFFICER THAT LEFT THE COHORT 
LOSS RECORD FLAG 
MARITAL STATUS AS OF 1994 OR TIME OF SEP 
MONTHS IN GRADE 
MARITAL STATUS 
2 63 ETS DAY OF MINIMUM SERVCE AGREEMENT 
2 61 ETS MONTH OF MINIMUM SERVICE AGREEMENT 
2 59 ETS YEAR OF MINIMUM SERVICE AGGREEMENT 
8 2452 ENTERED WITHOUT A COLLEGE DEGREE 
8 2460 ENTERED WITHOUT A COLLEGE DEGREE/OBTAINE 
8 2476 OBTAINED POSTGRADUATE DEGREE SINCE COMMI 
2 87 OFFICER/ENLISTED SERVICE 
2 2067 
2 97 PAY ENTRY BASE DATE - DAY 
2 2077 
2 95 PAY ENTRY BASE DATE - MONTH 
2 2075 
2 93 PAY ENTRY BASE DATE - YEAR 
2 2073 
6 115 PROGRAM ELEMENT CODE 
6 2097 














PAY GRADE AT TIME OF SEPARATION 
FIXED AND ROTARY-WING PILOTS AND NFOS 
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION CODES 
PRIMARY MOS,AFSC,RATING/NEC 
5 2521 EITHER WHITE/BLACK/HISPANIC/OTHER 





















REASON FOR SEPARATION 
DATE OF SEPARATION - DAY 
DATE OF SEPARATION - MONTH 
DATE OF SEPARATION - YEAR 
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899 SERVICE Num 8 2396 01, 34, 40, 43, 44, AND 58 
23 SEX80-94 Num 2 51 SEX 
833 SEX L Num 2 2031 
16 SOCB0-94 Num 2 37 SOURCE OF COMMISSION 
826 SOC L Num 2 2017 
913 SOURCE Char 4 2509 SOURCE OF COMMISSION 
47 SPANSR80-94Num 2 99 SPANISH SURNAME FLAG 
857 SPANSR L Num 2 2079 
879 SPD L Num 8 2236 SEPARATION PROGRAM DESIGNATOR 
905 STAY PROM Num 8 2444 ANY OFFICER THAT STAYED TO THE 0-4 PROM 
900 SUPPORT Num 8 2404 02, 04, 13, 25, 26, 30 AND 35 
858 svc Num 2 2081 
14 SVC80-94 Num 2 33 SERVICE 
824 SVC L Num 2 2013 
1 TAFMS80-94Num 3 0 TOTAL ACTIVE FEDERAL MILITARY svc 
811 TAFMS L Num 3 1980 
864 UIC80-94 Char 8 2116 UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODE 
880 UIC L Char 8 2244 
651 UNTZIP80-94Char 5 121 UNIT ZIP CODE 
862 UNTZIP L Char 5 2103 
24 YOCS80-94 Num 2 53 YEAR OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE 
834 YOCS L Num 2 2033 
40 YOS80-94 Num 2 85 YEARS OF ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE 
850 YOS L Num 2 2065 
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OBPGRAD SELECTION MODEL CORRELATION MATRIX 
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS I PROS> IRI UNDER HO:RHO=O IN= 1087 
AVGPI COMPRK GCT ROTC ACADEMY OCS ENLCOM MINORITY FEMALE MARRIED 
1.00000 -0.32913 0.08147 0.08195 0.09258 -0.06544 0.03413 -0.10572 -0.02714 0.27626 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0072 0.0069 0.0022 0.0310 0.2609 0.0005 0.3714 0.0001 
0.32913 1.00000 -0.20472 -0.04765 0.12736 -0.01047 -0.13882 0.20837 0.12784 -0.07821 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.1164 0.0001 0.7301 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0099 
0.08147 -0.20472 1.00000 -0.05485 0.13571 -0.01984 0.08790 -0.10312 -0.01136 0.05288 
0.0072 0.0001 0.0000 0.0707 0.0001 0.5134 0.0037 0.0007 0.7083 0.0814 
0.08195 -0.04765 -0.05485 1.00000 -0.17191 -0.28291 -0.17364 0.00807 0.04190 0.03553 
0.0069" 0.1164 0.0707 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.7904 0.1674 0.2418 
0.09258 0.12736 0.13571 -0.17191 1.00000 -0.18529 -0.11372 0.06448 -0.00515 0.08102 
0.0022 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0335 0.8654 0.0075 
0.06544 -0.01047 -0.01984 -0.28291 -0.18529 1.00000 -0.18715 -0.03492 0.07688 -0.11062 
0.0310 0.7301 0.5134 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.2500 0.0112 0.0003 
0.03413 -0.13882 0.08790 -0.17364 -0.11372 -0.18715 1.00000 0.04990 0.10593 0.01843 
0.2609 0.0001 0.0037 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.1001 0.0005 0.5438 
0.10572 0.20837 -0.10312 0.00807 0.06448 -0.03492 0.04990 1.00000 0.02971 -0.04536 
0.0005 0.0001 0.0007 0.7904 0.0335 0.2500 0.1001 0.0000 0.3277 0.1350 
0.02714 0.12784 -0.01136 0.04190 -0.00515 0.07688 0.10593 0.02971 1.00000 -0.10244 
0.3714 0.0001 0.7083 0.1674 0.8654 0.0112 0.0005 0.3277 0.0000 0.0007 
0.27626 -0.07821 0.05288 0.03553 0.08102 -0.11062 0.01843 -0.04536 -0.10244 1.00000 
0.0001 0.0099 0.0814 0.2418 0.0075 0.0003 0.5438 0.1350 0.0007 0.0000 
69 
STAYPROM SELECTION MODEL CORRELATION MATRIX 
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS I PROB > IRI UNDER HO:RHO=O I N = 1087 
AVGPI COMPRK OBPGRAD COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PILOTS ROTC ACADEMY ocs 
AVGPI 1.00000 -0.32913 0.15844 -0.02051 -0.01118 -0.13500 0.13811 0.08195 0.09258 -0.06544 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.4993 0.7127 0.0001 0.0001 0.0069 0.0022 0.0310 
COMPRK 0.32913 1.00000 -0.08612 -0.04831 0.04275 0.08907 -0.05337 -0.04765 0.12736 -0.01047 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0045 0.1114 0.1590 0.0033 0.0786 0.1164 0.0001 0.7301 
OBPGRAD 0.15844 -0.08612 1.00000 -0.05981 0.05179 0.04488 -0.00474 -0.04583 0.07218 0.05706 
0.0001 0.0045 0.0000 0.0487 0.0879 0.1392 0.8759 0.1311 0.0173 0.0600 
COMBAT 0.02051 -0.04831 -0.05981 1.00000 -0.21180 -0.39434 -0.46452 0.06112 -0.09010 -0.04050 
0.4993 0.1114 0.0487 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0439 0.0029 0.1822 
SERVICE 0.01118 0.04275 0.05179 -0.21180 1.00000 -0.15794 -0.18605 0.04498 0.04997 -0.03127 
0.7127 0.1590 0.0879 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.1383 0.0996 0.3030 
SUPPORT 0.13500 0.08907 0.04488 -0.39434 -0.15794 1.00000 -0.34638 0.00890 -0.09460 0.00147 
0.0001 0.0033 0.1392 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.7694 0.0018 0.9614 
PILOTS 0.13811 -0.05337-0.00474-0.46452-0.18605 -0.34638 1.00000-0.10240 0.16893 0.05460 
CL0001 0.0786 0.8759 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 0.0720 
ROTC 0.08195 -0.04765 -0.04583 0.06112 0.04498 0.00890 -0.10240 1.00000 -0.17191 -0.28291 
0.0069 0.1164 0.1311 0.0439 0.1383 0.7694 0.0007 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
ACADEMY 0.09258 0.12736 0.07218 -0.09010 0.04997 -0.09460 0.16893 -0.17191 1.00000 -0.18529 
0.0022 0.0001 0.0173 0.0029 0.0996 0.0018 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
ocs 0.06544 -0.01047 0.05706 -0.04050 -0.03127 0.00147 0.05460 -0.28291 -0.18529 1.00000 
0.0310 0.7301 0.0600 0.1822 0.3030 0.9614 0.0720 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
ENLCOM 0.03413 -0.13882 0.03474 0.00164 0.09290 0.04008 -0.14979 -0.17364 -0.11372 -0.18715 
0.2609 0.0001 0.2524 0.9568 0.0022 0.1867 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
RESERVE 0.16664 0.02191 -0.00575 0.02890 -0.04863 0.02753 -0.01775 -0.61574 -0.49950 0.37095 
0.0001 0.4705 0.8499 0.3412 0.1091 0.3646 0.5588 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
AGE 0.01033-0.11452 0.08417-0.05371 0.04202 0.07604-0.08075 -0.31283 -0.18819 0.31180 
0.7338 0.0002 0.0055 0.0767 0.1662 0.0122 0.0077 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
MINORITY 0.10572 0.20837 0.01649 -0.02014 0.05211 0.07750 -0.09802 0.00807 0.06448 -0.03492 
0.0005 0.0001 0.5870 0.5072 0.0860 0.0106 0.0012 0.7904 0.0335 0.2500 
FEMALE 0.02714 0.12784 0.06946 -0.16464 0.34774 0.11169 -0.14462 0.04190 -0.00515 0.07688 
0.3714 0.0001 0.0220 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.1674 0.8654 0.0112 
MARRIED 0.27626-0.07821 0.05852 -0.07392 0.01231 -0.02137 0.09300 0.03553 0.08102-0.11062 
0.0001 0.0099 0.0537 0.0148 0.6853 0.4815 0.0021 0.2418 0.0075 0.0003 
UNEMP 0.50901 0.19664 -0.24158 0.05803 0.03007 0.02660 -0.11073 -0.05523 -0.10563 0.09074 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0558 0.3220 0.3810 0.0003 0.0687 0.0005 0.0028 
MILLS1 0.11716 0.00000 0.97836 -0.03457 0.02741 0.05154 -0.01860 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 




















ENLCOM RESERVE AGE MINORITY FEMALE MARRIED UNEMP MILLS1 
0.03413 -0.16664 -0.01033 -0.10572 -0.02714 0.27626 -0.50901 0.11716 
0.2609 0.0001 0.7338 0.0005 0.3714 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
0.13882 0.02191 -0.11452 0.20837 0.12784 -0.07821 0.19664 0.00000 
0.0001 0.4705 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0099 0.0001 1.0000 
0.03474 -0.00575 0.08417 0.01649 0.06946 0.05852 -0.24158 0.97836 
0.2524 0.8499 0.0055 0.5870 0.0220 0.0537 0.0001 0.0001 
0.00164 0.02890-0.05371 -0.02014-0.16464-0.07392 0.05803 -0.03457 
0.9568 0.3412 0.0767 0.5072 0.0001 0.0148 0.0558 0.2548 
0.09290 -0.04863 0.04202 0.05211 o.34n4 0.01231 0.03007 0.02741 
0.0022 0.1091 0.1662 0.0860 0.0001 0.6853 0.3220 0.3667 
0.04008 0.02753 0.07604 o.on5o 0.11169 -0.02137 0.02660 0.05154 
0.1867 0.3646 0.0122 0.0106 0.0002 0.4815 0.3810 0.0895 
0.14979 -o.o1n5 -0.08075 -0.09802 -0.14462 o.o93oo -0.11073 -0.01860 
o.ooo1 o.5588 o.oon o.oo12 o.ooo1 0.0021 o.ooo3 o.5402 
0.17364 -0.61574 -0.31283 0.00807 0.04190 0.03553 -0.05523 0.00000 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0. 7904 0.1674 0.2418 0.0687 1.0000 
0.11372 -0.49950 -0.18819 0.06448 -0.00515 0.08102 -0.10563 -0.00000 
0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0335 0.8654 0.0075 0.0005 1.0000 
0.18715 0.37095 0.31180 -0.03492 0.07688 -0.11062 0.09074 -0.00000 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2500 0.0112 0.0003 0.0028 1.0000 
1.00000 0.02501 0.45501 0.04990 0.10593 0.01843 -0.00913 -0.00000 
0.0000 0.4100 0.0001 0.1001 0.0005 0.5438 0.7637 1.0000 
0.02501 1.00000 0.27190 -0.03985 -0.02325 -0.10388 0.12634 0.01922 
0.4100 0.0000 0.0001 0.1892 0.4437 0.0006 0.0001 0.5267 
0.45501 0.27190 1.00000 0.00916 0.01550 0.00288 0.01509 0.04548 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.7630 0.6097 0.9244 0.6192 0.1340 
0.04990 -0.03985 0.00916 1.00000 0.02971 -0.04536 0.06073 -0.00000 
0.1001 0.1892 0.7630 0.0000 o.32n 0.1350 0.0453 1.0000 
0.10593 -0.02325 0.01550 0.02971 1.00000-0.10244 0.08249 -0.00000 
o.ooo5 o.4437 o.6097 o.32n o.oooo o.ooo7 o.oo65 1.oooo 
0.01843 -0.10388 0.00288 -0.04536 -0.10244 1.00000 -0.29205 -0.00000 
0.5438 0.0006 0.9244 0.1350 0.0007 0.0000 0.0001 1.0000 
0.00913_ 0.12634 _0.01509 0.06073 0.08249 -0.29205 1.00000 -0.21419 
0.7637 0.0001 0.6192 0.0453 0.0065 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
0.00000 0.01922 0.04548 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.21419 1.00000 





















PROMOTION MODEL CORRELATION MATRIX 
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS I PROS > IRI UNDER HO:RHO=O I N = 455 
AVGPI COMPRK GCT OBPGRAD COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PILOTS ROTC ACADEMY 
1.00000 -0.22982 0.03258 0.05887 0.03681 -0.03463 -0.15087 0.10450 -0.01955 -0.03172 
0.0000 0.0001 0.4881 0.2101 0.4335 0.4611 0.0012 0.0258 0.6775 0.4997 
0.22982 1.00000 -0.19371 -0.03985 -0.06926 0.05113 0.04431 0.00524 0.01694 0.18184 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.3964 0.1402 0.2764 0.3456 0.9112 0.7186 0.0001 
0.03258 -0.19371 1.00000 0.01890 -0.07952 -0.05587 -0.00229 0.15277 -0.02150 0.15390 
0.4881 0.0001 0.0000 0.6877 0.0902 0.2342 0.9611 0.0011 0.6475 0.0010 
0.05887 -0.03985 0.01890 1.00000 -0.10264 0.07399 0.06786 0.01317 -0.07640 0.05217 
0.2101 0.3964 0.6877 0.0000 0.0286 0.1150 0.1484 0.7794 0.1036 0.2668 
0.03681 -0.06926 -0.07952 -0.10264 1.00000 -0.21487 -0.38503 -0.45988 0.10188 -0.10257 
0.4335 0.1402 0.0902 0.0286 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0298 0.0287 
0.03463 0.05113 -0.05587 0.07399-0.21487 1.00000-0.16329-0.19504 0.01669 0.04443 
0.4611 0.2764 0.2342 0.1150 0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 0.7226 0.3444 
0.15087 0.04431 -0.00229 0.06786 -0.38503 -0.16329 1.00000 -0.34950 0.00400 -0.16660 
0.0012 0.3456 0.9611 0.1484 0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 0.9322 0.0004 
0.10450 0.00524 0.15277 0.01317 -0.45988 -0.19504 -0.34950 1.00000 -0.11411 0.28352 
0.0258 0.9112 0.0011 0.7794 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0149 0.0001 
0.01955 0.01694 -0.02150 -0.07640 0.10188 0.01669 0.00400 -0.11411 1.00000 -0.22085 
0.6775 0.7186 0.6475 0.1036 0.0298 0.7226 0.9322 0.0149 0.0000 0.0001 
0.03172 0.18184 0.15390 0.05217 -0.10257 0.04443 -0.16660 0.28352 -0.22085 1.00000 
0.4997 0.0001 0.0010 0.2668 0.0287 0.3444 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
0.03038 -0.05274 -0.01150 0.11831 -0.12286 0.02016 0.04040 0.06539 -0.26707 -0.18723 
0.5181 0.2616 0.8068 0.0116 0.0087 0.6680 0.3899 0.1638 0.0001 0.0001 
0.01319 -0.24983 0.07480 0.02462 0.03483 0.02754 0.06095 -0.18912 -0.21453 -0.15040 
0.7791 0.0001 0.1111 0.6004 0.4586 0.5580 0.1944 0.0001 0.0001 0.0013 
0.05025 -0.05203 -0.13340 0.04181 0.01129 -0.00491 0.07378 -0.07096 -0.52693 -0.49541 
0.2848 0.2680 0.0044 0.3736 0.8101 0.9168 0.1161 0.1307 0.0001 0.0001 
0.04242 -0.25011 0.04355 0.09858 -0.04069 0.00936 0.10897 -0.12759 -0.34854-0.20898 
0.3666 0.0001 0.3540 0.0355 0.3865 0.8421 0.0201 0.0064 0.0001 0.0001 
0.07750 0.12184 -0.02408 0.01583 -0.01559 0.03913 0.04299 -0.08305 -0.01198 0.08587 
0.0987 0.0093 0.6085 0.7363 0.7402 0.4050 0.3602 0.0768 0.7988 0.0672 
0.13896 0.17138 -0.11417 0.07994 -0.14023 0.27563 0.08728 -0.12729 0.05233 -0.07752 
0.0030 0.0002 0.0148 0.0885 0.0027 0.0001 0.0629 0.0066 0.2653 0.0986 
0.13234 0.02994 -0.00377 -0.04936 0.04009 -0.12872 -0.00516 0.03658 -0.04051 0.00997 
0.0047 0.5241 0.9360 0.2934 0.3936 0.0060 0.9125 0.4364 0.3886 0.8321 
0.04841 0.03205 -0.00320 0.98459 -0.08778 0.06452 0.08066 -0.00427 -0.02161 -0.00686 
0.3029 0.4953 0.9458 0.0001 0.0613 0.1695 0.0857 0.9277 0.6457 0.8841 
0.48988 0.17631 -0.04003 -0.21218 -0.03582 0.03368 -0.04764 0.06356 0.03296-0.01039 
















OCS ENLCOM RESERVE AGE MINORITY FEMALE MARRIED MILLS1 MILLS2 
0.03038 0.01319 0.05025 0.04242 -0.07750 -0.13896 0.13234 0.04841 -0.48988 
0.5181 0.7791 0.2848 0.3666 0.0987 0.0030 0.0047 0.3029 0.0001 
0.05274 -0.24983 -0.05203 -0.25011 0.12184 0.17138 0.02994 0.03205 0.17631 
0.2616 0.0001 0.2680 0.0001 0.0093 0.0002 0.5241 0.4953 0.0002 
0.01150 0.07480 -0.13340 0.04355 -0.02408 -0.11417 -0.00377 -0.00320 -0.04003 
0.8068 0.1111 0.0044 0.3540 0.6085 0.0148 0.9360 0.9458 0.3943 
0.11831 0.02462 0.04181 0.09858 0.01583 0.07994 -0.04936 0.98459 -0.21218 
0.0116 0.6004 0.3736 0.0355 0.7363 0.0885 0.2934 0.0001 0.0001 
0.12286 0.03483 0.01129 -0.04069 -0.01559 -0.14023 0.04009 -0.08778 -0.03582 
0.0087 0.4586 0.8101 0.3865 0.7402 0.0027 0.3936 0.0613 0.4459 
0.02016 0.02754 -0.00491 0.00936 0.03913 0.27563 -0.12872 0.06452 0.03368 
0.6680 0.5580 0.9168 0.8421 0.4050 0.0001 0.0060 0.1695 0.4736 
0.04040 0.06095 0.07378 0.10897 0.04299 0.08728 -0.00516 0.08066 -0.04764 
0.3899 0.1944 0.1161 0.0201 0.3602 0.0629 0.9125 0.0857 0.3106 
0.06539 -0.18912 -0.07096 -0.12759 -0.08305 -0.12729 0.03658 -0.00427 0.06356 
0.1638 0.0001 0.1307 0.0064 0.0768 0.0066 0.4364 0.9277 0.1759 
0.26707 -0.21453 -0.52693 -0.34854 -0.01198 0.05233 -0.04051 -0.02161 0.03296 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.7988 0.2653 0.3886 0.6457 0.4831 
0.18723 -0.15040 -0.49541 -0.20898 0.08587 -0.07752 0.00997 -0.00686 -0.01039 
0.0001 0.0013 0.0001 0.0001 0.0672 0.0986 0.8321 0.8841 0.8251 
1.00000 -0.18187 0.37793 0.26623 -0.03222 0.14521 -0.04589 0.06048 0.00526 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.4930 0.0019 0.3287 0.1979 0.9109 
0.18187 1.00000 -0.00764 0.56132 0.00205 0.02894 -0.01728 -0.00705 -0.06245 
0.0001 0.0000 0.8708 0.0001 0.9652 0.5380 0.7131 0.8808 0.1836 
0.37793 -0.00764 1.00000 0.23944 -0.02273 0.03750 0.03212 0.05568 -0.01678 
0.0001 0.8708 0.0000 0.0001 0.6287 0.4249 0.4943 0.2359 0.7211 
0.26623 0.56132 0.23944 1.00000 -0.02915 0.04337 -0.01468 0.05722 -0.06993 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.5352 0.3560 0.7548 0.2232 0.1364 
MINORITY 0.03222 0.00205 -0.02273 -0.02915 1.00000 0.00744 0.02537 -0.00993 0.04595 
0.4930 0.9652 0.6287 0.5352 0.0000 0.8742 0.5894 0.8327 0.3281 
FEMALE 0.14521 0.02894 0.03750 0.04337 0.00744 1.00000 -0.24367 0.04571 0.06916 
0.0019 0.5380 0.4249 0.3560 0.8742 0.0000 0.0001 0.3307 0.1408 
MARRIED 0.04589 -0.01728 0.03212 -0.01468 0.02537 -0.24367 1.00000 -0.07609 -0.17756 
0.3287 0.7131 0.4943 0.7548 0.5894 0.0001 0.0000 0.1050 0.0001 
MILLS1 0.06048 -0.00705 0.05568 0.05722 -0.00993 0.04571 -0.07609 1.00000 -0.19367 
0.1979 0.8808 0.2359 0.2232 0.8327 0.3307 0.1050 0.0000 0.0001 
MILLS2 0.00526 -0.06245 -0.01678 -0.06993 0.04595 0.06916 -0.17756 -0.19367 1.00000 
0.9109 0.1836 0.7211 0.1364 0.3281 0.1408 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
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